



LEADERSHIP

2nd Edition

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LEADERSHIP

An Anthology (2nd Edition)



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The task of leadership is not to put greatness into humanity, but to elicit it, for the greatness is already there.

John BUCHAN
Lord Tweedsmuir of Elsfield



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FOREWORD

The difference between success and failure often rides on the strength of a single quality: leadership. An organisation with a weak, ineffectual leader is doomed to fail. One with a clear sighted and courageous leader can overcome virtually any adversity.¹

It is difficult to overstate the importance of leadership in a military context, where the consequences of success or failure may be profound but the likelihood of either outcome is ambiguous. While strong and courageous leadership is needed at all levels to achieve success, it must be underpinned by a degree of emotional intelligence and the empowerment of subordinates in order to get the most from our people.

The RAF Leadership Centre consulted over a thousand RAF personnel, from leading aircraftsman to air chief marshal to gather their views on leadership. The results showed, not surprisingly, that leadership was exercised at every rank and that the fundamentals of good leadership did not change so very much at whatever level you looked. This book is set out so the extracts and stories illustrate some elements of leadership and the Attributes for RAF Leaders. These attributes will not make you a leader by themselves, but ensuring they are at the core of your own leadership styles will improve your leadership - we each have a personal responsibility to develop our leadership potential. The stories used to illustrate them, being leadership in action, display more than just one attribute, so while most could fit in many places in the book, we have chosen one place; you may like to consider where else they could go.

The experiences recounted in this book come from the wars and operations that military people have been engaged in over the ages; most of them come from RAF personnel. There are very few accounts of leadership in peacetime. Nevertheless the purpose of this book is to inspire good leadership at all times. If you can translate the lessons from the stories into your everyday leadership when not on operations as well as to those times that you are, your colleagues and subordinates and the RAF will be the better for it.

Finally, this book has not been written for you to read from cover to cover, but to dip into, use as a source of examples and to take inspiration from the efforts and achievements of others. Throughout time, people have sought out heroes who could set the example and show them the way in difficult times. It seems that we all need to be inspired. However, the people in this book are not here because they are special, only because we found their stories, some of them new to this second edition. There are many people in the RAF that have done just as well. We hope you find that some of the ones we have chosen inspire you too.

INTRODUCTION

Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on Earth.

James MacGregor BURNS, 1978

ROYAL AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre, 2004

The Royal Air Force requires personnel with strong leadership attributes, excellent managerial skills and the confidence to exercise command.² Effective leadership is essential throughout the Service; in the front line as well as in our training establishments; in the field as well as in the office; in the turbulence of war as well as in the calm of peace.

*Leadership is visionary; it is the projection of personality and character to inspire people to achieve the desired outcome.*³

This is equally relevant in the air and on the ground, whether it is two or three personnel working together in a peer group or a large and geographically dispersed organisation with its own hierarchical structure, such as a Main Operating Base. The circumstances and emphasis may change, leadership may be shared, means of communication may alter, the pressures of time and resources may vary dramatically but the precepts remain the same.

It must also be recognised that the nature of air power has provided Air Forces with a distinct culture and tradition. The close relationship between officers and other ranks – built around the trust engendered by the technical skills of the latter and the dominant (but not exclusive) fighting role of the former – has given the Royal Air Force a special character and ethos.

*The development of warfare itself...called for a system of command which,... increasingly demanded a degree of technical, administrative and professional expertise that was not necessarily to be found among the traditional officer-producing classes. Further, it demanded among all ranks a degree of intelligent co-operation and devolution of authority, very different from the instant and unquestioning obedience, which the old hierarchy had expected and very largely got. The new Royal Air Force, in particular, with its increasing dependence on technology, very quickly found that a structure of command based on rigid distinctions between officers and other ranks simply did not work.*⁴

While the qualities of good military leadership remain timeless – such as courage, integrity, loyalty and fighting spirit – the Royal Air Force has developed a leadership system adapted to the unique nature of air warfare, built on a loose organisational structure and drawing on a strong team ethos underpinned by mutual respect and trust between ranks. We seek to build on this approach by encouraging effective leadership across all ranks and rewarding initiative rather than attributing blame. Leadership is

about accepting responsibility and taking ownership of problems. It is also about creating a culture, through empowerment, to allow others to take ownership of problems. Implementing solutions requires knowledge and understanding to assess the risks involved together with the moral courage to see things through. Avoiding necessary risk is an abrogation of leadership responsibility, as is hiding behind process or the supine acceptance of codes drawn up by people who are not accountable for the decisions leaders have to take.⁵

These principles find significant resonance with the demands of expeditionary warfare and effects-based operations. The Royal Air Force's collective approach to delivering military output has been built on the responsiveness, robustness, flexibility and adaptability of its people. These same qualities are also essential to achieving a network-enabled capability. Leaders are required to define goals that might, for a small team, be short term and practical in nature, or for a large team, longer term and more visionary. Achieving success is facilitated by implementing the tenets of mission command, by the effective deployment of the team's collective skills and experience and the efficient use of resources. However, there is no prescribed model for leadership or any single approach that will guarantee success. Rather, we must focus on the through-life development of personal styles based on self-awareness and a sound understanding of others. The Royal Air Force aims to pursue excellence in leadership at all levels and, in so doing, to turn good leaders into great ones.

[The leaders] required for turning a good company into a great one... are a paradoxical blend of personal humility and professional will.⁶ It is not that [they] have no ego or self-interest... but their ambition is first and foremost for the institution, not themselves.⁷

The demands on Royal Air Force leaders continue to grow and evolve. A coherent, structured development programme across all ranks is essential to achieving and maintaining excellence in leadership. Initial officer and airmen training provide the essential foundation in leadership skills and awareness. Thereafter, individual abilities are developed through a coherent, progressive programme that provides a broader exposure to leadership styles and builds on individual experience. In addition, opportunity and context-driven interventions at unit level further enhance individual and team leadership skills.

New technology and the growth in effects-based operations facilitated by network-enabled capability increasingly blur the distinction between the support area and the front line. The emphasis is on enabling individuals to function as part of a wider team – invariably multidisciplinary, increasingly joint and often multinational – in the delivery of military capability. Any member of the Royal Air Force could find themselves in a situation where all their courage and war fighting abilities are

required. Effective leadership at all levels and across all ranks will be key to the Service's success in meeting the challenges of new technology, expeditionary warfare, structural changes to the defence organisation, an increasingly diverse workforce and changes in wider society that affect our people and those we seek to recruit.

The range, precision, ubiquity and utility of air power continue to grow, as does the contribution of every individual to our operational capability. Wherever its personnel serve, the Royal Air Force celebrates professional excellence and leads through it.

*Leaders there have to be, and these may appear to rise above their fellow men, but in their hearts they know only too well that what has been attributed to them is in fact the achievement of the team to which they belong.*⁸



There is a difference between leadership and management. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded by personality and vision: its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation of statistics, of methods, timetables and routine: its practice is a science.

Field Marshal Viscount William SLIM of Burma
Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Governor General of Australia, 1953



ETHOS AND CORE VALUES

Our ethos defines not only the spirit of the Royal Air Force but also the hopes and aspirations of each and every member of the Service. It inspires, binds and ultimately it is the inheritance we leave our successors.

Air Commodore Peter DYE
Air Commodore Ground Training, 2002

Royal Navy Ethos

The Spirit to Fight and Win, 2009

The enduring spirit derived from our people's loyalty to their ship, unit or team, sustained by high professional standards and strong leadership, that gives us courage in adversity and the determination to fight and win.



Army Ethos

The Values and Standards of the British Army, January 2008

Soldiers are part of a team, and the effectiveness of that team depends on each individual playing his or her part to the full. Success depends above all else on good morale, which is the spirit that enables soldiers to triumph over adversity: morale linked to, and reinforced by, discipline.



Royal Air Force Ethos

AP1, (2nd Edition), Ethos, Core Values and Standards, 2008

Our distinctive character, spirit and attitude that is necessary to pull together as a team, in order to deliver air power no matter the challenges or environment. We place unit and Royal Air Force success above self and strive to be courageous in the face of adversity and risk. Sustained by strong leadership, high professional and personal standards, we are bound by a strong sense of tradition and belonging to an organisation of which we are immensely proud.



Flying Officer Vivian ROSEWARNE

Co-pilot of Wellington Bomber from Royal Air Force Marham

Published by Group Captain Claude Keith as an anonymous letter,
reproduced below as printed in *The Times*, June 18, 1940

MY EARTHLY MISSION IS FULFILLED

Among the personal belongings of a young RAF pilot in a bomber squadron who was recently reported 'Missing, believed killed,' was a letter to his mother – to be sent to her if he were killed... It was published in order to bring comfort to other mothers, and that every one in our country may feel proud to read of the sentiments which support 'an average airman' in the execution of his present arduous duties.

Dearest Mother, – Though I feel no premonition at all, events are moving rapidly, and I have instructed that this letter be forwarded to you should I fail to return from one of the raids which we shall shortly be called upon to undertake. You must hope on for a month, but at the end of that time you must accept the fact that I have handed my task over to the extremely capable hands of my comrades of the Royal Air Force, as so many splendid fellows have already done.

First, it will comfort you to know that my role in this war has been of the greatest importance. Our patrols far out over the North Sea have helped to keep the trade routes clear for our convoys and supply ships, and on one occasion our information was instrumental in saving the lives of the men in a crippled lighthouse relief ship. Though it will be difficult for you, you will disappoint me if you do not at least try to accept the facts dispassionately, for I shall have done my duty to the utmost of my ability. No man can do more, and no one calling himself a man could do less.

I have always admired your amazing courage in the face of continual setbacks; in the way you have given me as good an education and background as anyone in the country; and always kept up appearances without ever losing faith in the future. My death would not mean that your struggle has been in vain. Far from it. It means that your sacrifice is as great as mine. Those who serve England must expect nothing from her; we debase ourselves if we regard our country as merely a place in which to eat and sleep.

History resounds with illustrious names who have given all, yet their sacrifice has resulted in the British Empire, where there is a measure of peace, justice, and freedom for all, and where a higher standard of civilization has evolved, and is still evolving, than anywhere else. But this is not only concerning our own land. Today we are faced with the greatest organized challenge to Christianity and civilization that the world has ever seen, and I count myself lucky and honoured to be the right age and

fully trained to throw my full weight into the scale. For this I have to thank you. Yet there is more work for you to do. The home front will still have to stand united for years after the war is won. For all that can be said against it, I still maintain that this war is a very good thing; every individual is having the chance to give and dare all for his principle like the martyrs of old. However long the time may be, one thing can never be altered – I shall have lived and died an Englishman. Nothing else matters one jot nor can anything ever change it.

You must not grieve for me, for if you really believe in religion and all that it entails that would be hypocrisy. I have no fear of death; only a queer elation . . . I would have it no other way. The universe is so vast and so ageless that the life of one man can only be justified by the measure of his sacrifice. We are sent to this world to acquire a personality and a character to take with us that can never be taken from us. Those who just eat and sleep, prosper and procreate are no better than animals if all their lives they are at peace.

I firmly and absolutely believe that evil things are sent into the world to try us; they are sent deliberately by our Creator to test our metal because He knows what is good for us. The Bible is full of cases where the easy way out has been discarded for moral principles.

I count myself fortunate in that I have seen the whole country and, known men of every calling. But with the final test of war I consider my character fully developed. Thus at my early age my earthly mission is already fulfilled and I am prepared to die with just one regret, and one only – that I could not devote myself to making your declining years more happy by being with you; but you will live in peace and freedom and I shall have directly contributed to that, so here again my life will not have been in vain.

Your loving Son,



Squadron Leader R COOKE

From a paper, Morale and Discipline, 1943

There is only one way of leading men and that is not by driving them. It is effected by the use of many qualities, which must be fully developed in every good NCO. They include tact, efficiency, forceful character, and personality.

Subordinates, not only watch their superiors on and off duty, but discuss their merits, and quite frequently their demerits, behind their backs. An NCO must retain the absolute faith and trust of those he is to lead. This can only be effected by a faultless personal example in all things. Efficiency in his professional duty, firmness, going hand in hand with reasonable tolerance, and above all, scrupulous justice to all. On the other hand, blustering, bullying, high handedness and intolerance must be avoided at all costs. No non-commissioned officer can hope to cover up his inefficiency as a leader of men, by camouflage of this undesirable nature.

Try to be quietly efficient, to be courteous is no sign of weakness. It is as easy to insist on an order being carried out in a quiet manner, as by bluster and pomposity.

The object of your leadership is to develop discipline, which is gradually produced by training men and women to act in accordance with laws and regulations made for the benefit of them all, without question. The value of your leadership will depend upon your personal example.

When your own discipline is beyond criticism, only then, can you properly insist upon others being meticulous in these matters. Remember the old maxim:-

He who would command must first himself obey.



Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert BROOKE-POPHAM

Commander in Chief Far East, 1942

From a paper, *Duties of an Officer*, 1943

It is noticeable that many of the great leaders of our race have been characterised by their gentleness and modesty, qualities that were also expected from the knights of old. Modesty was traditional in the Royal Flying Corps and has led in the Royal Air Force to a severe code of duty, a high standard of quiet courage and an immense corporate pride.

There is much truth in the saying 'trust men greatly and they will prove themselves great,' and airmen are highly susceptible to an appeal to their better nature, because of the pride they rightly take in their Service.

In military culture especially in recent times, tradition has assumed a far greater direct importance and has frequently become a formal component of military organisation. This is in part because the military in most modern Western societies are seen as, and see themselves as, being something extraordinary, something apart from the run of the mill structure of the society. This is both because their core function is one, which sits uncomfortably with, or runs counter to, many other aspects of an orderly modern society, and partly because it may require of them a willingness to operate in circumstances, which are by normal standards extreme. To function effectively in such circumstances therefore calls for a degree of cohesion and unparalleled commitment that is not usually called for in civil institutions.

Whilst good leadership is often present, exceptional leadership is rare, and all military organisations, however well run, will contain a proportion of poor or below average leaders. The experience of centuries has shown that the loyalty and cohesion required to function in extreme circumstances is reinforced by tradition and ethos, to the extent that it may even overcome the handicap of poor leaders by providing an alternative focus of inspiration.

Faced with creating the world's first independent military air arm with its own independent staff and bureaucracy, the early leaders of the RAF were presented with a problem. The Service itself was created by amalgamating two existing military traditions to fulfil a separate military goal. Some traditions, for example the term squadron, had already been transferred across from previous military practice. Others were created anew by drawing on the activity itself as inspiration, as with wings and flights, and the Royal Flying Corps motto, now the RAF motto, *Per Ardua Ad Astra*...Trenchard was conscious of the need to preserve and build on the Service tradition, which had been built up already. "Traditions are really most important in order to keep discipline and a good tone, and, in a new service this is still more important". Whilst the language may have dated, the underlying rationale has not. He argued not only that the squadron should be retained, but that existing squadron numberplates should be preserved, as they fostered *esprit de corps* and "by changing the titles and making completely new squadrons, traditions built up through four years of war, will be lost;" a move which he characterised as being extremely unpopular both inside and outside the RAF. Trenchard effectively established the flying squadron as the basic building block of the RAF in terms of military organisation, operations and tradition.

Not content with merely preserving the traditions of the wartime units Trenchard went further and stated, under a paragraph entitled *Extreme Importance of Training*, that:

To make an Air Force worthy of the name, we must create an Air Force spirit, or rather foster this spirit which undoubtedly existed in a high degree during the war, by every means in our power. Suggestions have been made that we should rely on the older Services to train our cadets and Staff officers. To do so would be to make the creation of an Air Force spirit an impossibility...

It is clear from these passages that Trenchard understood very clearly that four years of harsh and bloody combat had already forged an Air Force spirit and tradition, that such intangibles were of inestimable value to the Service, and that equally they could very easily be destroyed by bureaucratic thoughtlessness or lack of vision and understanding. He therefore set out very deliberately to ensure, so far as he could, that this would not happen, and he did so by creating permanent Air Force institutions which would be imbued with this spirit and tradition, and which would in turn imbue it in others. Foremost amongst the institutions designed to foster an RAF ethos were the RAF Cadet College at Cranwell, and the RAF Apprentice School at Halton.

In effect [through these institutions] Trenchard instituted a social revolution in the British military, and one, which reverberates to this day. He set out deliberately to recruit the very best men he could find into all levels of the Service, and then to offer them high quality training and established career patterns, whilst at the same time deliberately inculcating a Service spirit and tradition, and one which subtly suggested that they were the *crème de la crème*. The high quality personnel drawn into the Service through these opportunities provided the leadership cadres at all levels which were one of the principal reasons that the Service was able to expand from a force smaller than the current Royal Air Force to a peak strength of 1.2 million men in 1944 and yet remain an effective fighting force with high morale.



Stephen BUNGAY

Flight Lieutenant Ronald WIGHT - Royal Air Force WWII Fighter Pilot.

From *The Most Dangerous Enemy*, 2000

The ethos of Fighter Command resulted in a force, which thought so highly of itself, it never imagined it could be beaten. On 27 May, at the time of the Dunkirk evacuation, Flight Lieutenant Ronald Wight, a flight commander with 213 Squadron who had already seen action in France, wrote to his mother:

Well, another day is gone, and with it a lot of grand blokes. Got another brace of 109's today, but the whole of the Luftwaffe seems to leap on us – we are hopelessly outnumbered. I was caught napping by a 109 in the middle of a dogfight and got a couple of holes in the aircraft, one of them filled the office with smoke, but the Jerry overshot and he's dead.

If anyone says anything to you in the future about the inefficiency of the RAF – I believe the BEF troops were booing the RAF in Dover the other day – tell them from me we only wish we could do more. But without more aircraft we can do no more than we have done – that is, our best, and that's fifty times better than the German best, though they are fighting under the most advantageous conditions.

I know of no RAF pilot who has refused combat yet – and that sometimes means combat with odds of more than fifty-to-one. Three of us the other day had been having a fight and were practically out of ammunition and juice when we saw more than eighty 109s with twelve Ju 87s. All the same, we gave them combat, so much so that they left us alone in the end – on their side of the Channel too. This is just the work that we all do. One of my Sergeants shot down three fighters and a bomber before they got him – and then he got back in a paddle steamer.

So don't worry. We are going to win this war even if we have only one aeroplane and one pilot left. The Boche could produce the whole Luftwaffe and you would see the one pilot and the one aeroplane go into combat...the spirit of the average pilot has to be seen to be believed.



Reverend (Squadron Leader) Chris WEBB

Royal Air Force College Chaplain, Royal Air Force Cranwell

From Graduation Homily at Royal Air Force Cranwell, 2004

The American General, General Jumper, said “the character of a country can be seen in the character of those who come forward to serve.” Character is not trained or formed by success, or by the ease by which we can do things, but how we overcome the obstacles and sufferings we face. It is the training of character that we are about. There may be many areas where we are weak, lots of things we may not be particularly good at, we will survive all of these; what we cannot do without, is character.

And at the heart of character is integrity. Integrity is defined, at least by some, as doing what is right when nobody is looking. Often people will not be looking, but do the right thing anyway. Often you will build something up and others will take the credit, or knock it down, build anyway. There will be people around you who will need your help, but they will turn on you and attack you, help them anyway. Honesty and transparency will make you vulnerable, be honest and transparent anyway. Give the world the very best you have and you may get hurt, give the world your best anyway.

And you may suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, surrounded by those who criticise all that you do, but remember: it is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better.

The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; because there is no effort without error and shortcomings; but who does actually strive to do the deed; who knows the great enthusiasm, the great devotion, who spends himself in a worthy cause, who at the best knows in the end triumph of high achievement and who at worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly. So that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.”



MORALE

You are well aware that it is not numbers or strength that bring victories in war. No, it is when one side goes against the enemy with the gods' gift of a stronger morale that their adversaries, as a rule, cannot withstand them.

XENOPHON
431-354BC

Squadron Leader Charles PORTAL

[Later Chief of the Air Staff and Marshal of the Royal Air Force,
The Viscount Charles Portal]

From an Essay on Morale, 1922

The conditions of war are not those under which the average man would choose to live. He must, during a campaign, adopt a manner of life which inflicts many hardships, mental and bodily, upon him.

In the first place there is the fear of death or bodily injury, which, though it grows and wanes again from time to time, never ceases to impose its silent strain. Secondly, there are the bodily trials, fatigue, hunger and thirst. Thirdly, there is the severance of the social ties, which bind a man to his home, his relations, and his friends.

Taken separately, each of these is enough to prevent any man from being naturally addicted to war. Taken together, they form a weight of horror against which the only counterpoise is the attribute which is called 'morale'. What is this strange force which enables a man to do what he naturally loathes doing, and to do it well? It cannot be any rare gift, for it is to be found in almost everyone if it is properly sought and cultivated. It is not a physical attribute, though the state of the body reacts so surely on the mind that certain physical conditions have to be fulfilled before it can be perfected.

Morale consists of those spiritual and mental qualities, which enable a man to surmount the obstacles of his natural instincts and desires, and to sink his own selfish nature in the furtherance of a cause. These qualities may be stated thus:-

- (a) The desire, present to a greater or less degree in most men, to strive and prevail against difficulties and hardships. This is the spirit of the hunter and the explorer.
- (b) Courage, which is the power of overcoming by an effort of will the instinct for self-preservation.
- (c) Patriotism – the desire to see one's country flourish and to have [a part] in her advancement and prosperity.
- (d) Enthusiasm for an ideal. A desire to see wrongs righted and wrongdoers punished.
- (e) Ambition – the hope of personal honour or advancement.
- (f) Confidence in the result of the battle or war.
- (g) Hatred of the foe.

- (h) The feeling of comradeship engendered by the very fact of serving with others and sharing their difficulties, dangers and hardships.

Closely akin to this is the horror of failing a comrade, follower or leader in the moment of danger. It is through its ideal of service that the Christian religion exerts its most powerful influence on morale.



Seb COX

Royal Air Force Air Historical Branch

From Royal Air Force Leadership Conference, 2009, discussing Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris' Leadership and its effect on morale during the inter-war years while OC 45 Squadron flying Vickers Vernon in Iraq.

Harris involved himself in many things beyond flying. He insisted, for example, that his junior officers attend lectures on technical aspects of their aircraft and received practical instruction in the workshops from the riggers and fitters. He also reinstated daily parades and physical fitness standards. He thus developed a squadron spirit and ethos across the rank and trade structure bringing the ground crew into close contact with the aircrew and vice versa. His junior aircrew were thus worked hard both in the air and on the ground, but morale remained high. In fact morale soared, not least because he also paid attention to his men. One of his biographers recorded his own words in regard to the conditions. “The appalling climate, the filthy food and the ghastly lack of every sort of amenity that our unfortunate men were compelled to put up with in peace time, for two years at a stretch away from their families.” Financial pressures on the RAF budget meant that domestic facilities were poor, lacking even adequate communal bathrooms. Harris visited the airmen’s kitchen and sampled the food and had it improved so far as he could. In those pre-air conditioning days, he also installed a device to spray water onto matting hung over the barrack room windows, which considerably lowered the stifling temperatures inside the barrack blocks. He also reorganised the officers’ mess and had it redecorated. Don’t forget, he’s still a Squadron Leader at this time.



Warrant Officer A DIXON

From *Royal Air Force Journal*, 1945

‘Airmen, Laughing, 3,000 of’

I was a ‘Kriegie’ for four years. What is a Kriegie? You may ask. Well, it is short for *Kriegsgefangene*, German for prisoner-of-war. Looking back, I can find so many things that amuse me that the unpleasant side of the business seems to have died a natural death. I should have been the last to admit this, at the time when we were being caught up by Monty’s armies in the far north of Germany, but that’s over now.

The first few months of captivity were the most difficult. The standard of living was far below anything we had imagined, but it was not unbearable. We learned to adjust ourselves to the conditions, and we soon realized that life would be largely what we made it. It was a great help to us that the average German was completely lacking in humour. A German can actually be embarrassed by hearty laughter. We Kriegies discovered this in the early years, and it was one of our strongest weapons to the end. For instance, it was customary for the Germans to announce punishments on the morning parades, and at each announcement 3,000 men would burst into prolonged cheers and hearty laughter. Men under guard, on their way to solitary confinement, would receive a round of applause. They would respond with a wave of the hand. A cut in the food rations would be greeted with rapturous applause. From our point of view the punishments were not funny, but the German reaction to our laughter certainly was. I remember a Major Jacob, a glassy-eyed, stiff-necked little man, ordering the British camp leader to announce that our ‘invasion’ had failed at Dieppe with heavy losses. We could not know that this was not a terrible defeat, but he looked such a self-satisfied little German. There was a moment’s silence and then we let him have it – a thunderous roar of cheering. It might have been VE-Day, and Jacob looked around in bewilderment. The parade ground was a seething mass of apparently delighted prisoners. He shuffled uncomfortably, made a few Donald Duck gestures in protest, and then looked quite dejected about the whole thing. We did not know what had happened at Dieppe, but we thought the demonstration was well worth the effort.



Field Marshal Sir Bernard MONTGOMERY

Commander Eighth Army and Allied Ground Forces Commander
Operation OVERLORD

From Lecture on Military Leadership given at The University of St Andrews, November 1945

No commander will long remain in the first rank unless he achieves success. The biggest single factor making for success in war is morale. A high morale is based on discipline, self-respect, and the confidence of the soldier in his commanders and in his weapons; it is a pearl of very great price and without it no success in battle will be achieved. A high morale is in fact a measure of the confidence of troops in their commander.

A commander must watch carefully his own morale. A battle is a contest between the will of the two opposing commanders; the one whose heart fails when the issue hangs in the balance will lose the battle. A commander, in fact, must throughout radiate confidence in his plan and operations, even though inwardly he may not be too sure of the outcome.



Sir Max HASTINGS

Comment on leadership of Bomber Aircrew during WWII

From Bomber Command, 1979

The decisive factor in the morale of bomber aircrew, like that of all fighting men, was leadership. At first, it is difficult to understand what impact a leader can have, when in battle his men are flying with only their own crews over Germany, far out of sight and command. Yet a post-war 8 Group medical report stated emphatically: "The morale of a squadron was almost always in direct proportion to the quality of leadership shown by the squadron commanders and the fluctuations in this respect were most remarkable." A good CO's crews pressed home attacks with more determination; suffered lower losses; perhaps above all, had a negligible 'Early Return' rate. Guy Gibson, the leader of the Dambusters, was one kind of legendary Bomber Command CO. Not a cerebral man, he represented the apogee of the pre-war English public schoolboy, the perpetual team captain, of unshakeable courage and dedication to duty, impatient of those who could not meet his standards. "He was the kind of boy who would have been head prefect in any school," said Sir Ralph Cochrane, his commander in 5 Group.

Sir Winston CHURCHILL

Prime Minister 1940 – 1945

Don't be careless about yourselves – on the other hand not too careful. Live well but do not flaunt it. Laugh a little and teach your men to laugh – get good humour under fire – war is a game that's played with a smile. If you can't smile, grin. If you can't grin, keep out of the way until you can.



Major General Nicholas VAUX

Commanding Officer 42 Commando Royal Marines during the Falklands Campaign, 1982

From March to the South Atlantic: 42 Commando in the Falklands Campaign, 1986

Leadership, of course, was the key. This began at the level of section commander, and was most prominent within the companies. That was why so many of our casualties had been young officers or NCOs. It was the explanation for the concentration of decorations between captain and corporal. Team spirit came next: the cohesive thread of military history; the *raison d'être* of Special Forces. The section, platoon, or company forms a separate identity, while their parent unit provides security in exchange for commitment, pride as the reward for loyalty. Last, but never least, came the peculiarly British, sardonic humour. An instinctive inheritance from one generation of servicemen to the next, we could not have won without it. Forgiving mistakes, dispelling frustration, mocking at fear, it eased our burden, made light of adversity. In the turn of a phrase, the roll of an eye, disaster could be mocked, misery uplifted.



General Sir Peter DE LA BILLIERE

Commander British Forces Middle East, Gulf War 1

From *Storm Command*, 1992

An equally important project was the establishment of a broadcasting station especially for the Gulf Forces. Until we got one, the servicemen had nothing to listen to except American Forces programmes and the fearful harriidan known as Baghdad Betty, who, between pop music records, broadcast doses of crude propaganda from the Iraqi capital and from an unidentified building in Kuwait. It was clear to me from the start that we needed a station of our own, so that we could keep our forces properly informed about what was happening and so that I myself could talk to them all from time to time. To me, a radio was essential – but to persuade London of the necessity was another matter.

Because the station would have to be mobile, we were going to need new equipment, which would cost between half and three-quarters of a million pounds. With Paddy Hine's help, I put together a case for the radio and submitted it to the Ministry of Defence. Tom King quickly appreciated the need and backed my request, but Whitehall failed to understand the importance of a radio station in such a widespread command. I gained the impression that the objectors considered the station a needless extravagance, and that they blocked our proposal on the grounds that we were not going to be in the Gulf long enough to justify such high expenditure....Eventually the front maintained by Paddy Hine and myself, and supported by the Secretary of State, carried the day: Protheroe's investment was saved and the new British Forces' Broadcasting Service station was flown out to us – but only after colossal and quite unnecessary expenditure of nervous energy.

Another medium of communication, which I considered vital, was the post. The bluey – the single-sheet air-mail letter form – is a war winner, nothing less. Handed out free to servicemen, it induces the warm feeling that at least the Government has given you something for nothing. It also has the advantage of offering limited space, so that you can fill it up quickly, especially if your writing is large. I myself wrote one to Bridget every day, and during the campaign as a whole phenomenal numbers of blueys were used. The cost was high – nearly £2 million – but again, the benefit to morale was incalculable. As British Forces' Commander, I put what some people might consider a disproportionate amount of time and effort into making sure that the post was as efficient as possible. The Americans had immense problems with their mail and, to Norman Schwarzkopf's fury, a letter often took four or five weeks to come through from the United States. Ours took more like four or five days and I did everything I could, to maintain this kind of service. When a postal strike seemed certain to take place in England, for instance, Paddy Hine arranged a special collection system in barracks in the United Kingdom and Germany, so that Forces' mail by-passed civilian post offices altogether.

Lieutenant Commander G HUTCHISON

Regarding Sir Ernest Shackleton's Leadership

From Advanced Command and Staff Course Paper, 2003

The importance of sustained morale is well understood, however Shackleton recognised that the maintenance of true optimism was vital when it was most difficult to achieve. Regardless of his own feelings, as setbacks arose, he needed to remain convincingly cheerful in order to stop any mounting feelings of depression amongst his men. When subjected to severe hardship, Shackleton knew that such depression could lead to friction, defiance, or merely 'giving up'. Day after day, to counter the morale-sapping effect of the miserable cold, wetness, fatigue, hunger, and boredom of their life on the ice, he summoned the strength to remain optimistic – despite suffering the same conditions himself. Shackleton recognised, and often reminded himself in his diaries, that 'Optimism is true moral courage.'

Shackleton recognised that much of the task of remaining optimistic could be accomplished by keeping the men so busy that they would have little opportunity to brood over their predicament. To that end, he encouraged and took part in, a variety of pastimes, such as card games and sing-a-longs. Seeking to keep his men fit as well; he encouraged football matches and dogsled races on the ice. When he sensed that the mood of the men was darkening, he would use a holiday or some other pretence to justify extra rations of food to boost morale. Shackleton appreciated the importance of what Roger Campbell calls 'leadership perception': *i.e.* being sensitive to other people's wants and needs and to changes in these wants and needs.



British Defence Doctrine

From Publication 2008, Maintenance of Morale, Page 2-3

No doctrine, plan or formula for conducting warfare is likely to succeed without the maintenance of morale which, except in the most extreme circumstances, depends upon affording personnel the best chances of success or survival. High morale is characterized by steadfastness, courage, confidence and sustained hope. It is especially manifested as staying power and resolve, the will to win and prevail in spite of provocation and adversity. It is sustained and progressively increased by success on operations and is most powerful when it suffuses the whole chain of command.

Air Vice-Marshal David WALKER

Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, 2003

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2005

I think fun is important not just to leadership but to human life. Without being too grand about it, in terms of running an organization, if it becomes so serious that there is no time for a bit of joking, a bit of laughter, a bit of human interaction that allows people to let off steam, then 'Jack becomes a very dull boy.' Therefore, if you are in any position of command, it doesn't matter whether it's a squadron or flight, you have got to have room for folk to enable them to relax within a good sense of behaviour. The organisation has to be able to relax and be comfortable within itself, in the same way that any family needs to be able to be comfortable within itself. From a commander's point of view, if too much emphasis is put on the task without addressing the team needs then, as a commander, you are not doing your job properly. You should be looking for opportunities where the team can come together to reinforce team building potential and strengths. What that argues for, is commanders who are comfortable in the organisational structure around them which will allow them to step back from the detail and make sure that the organisation as a whole moves forward.



Air Chief Marshal Sir Paddy HINE

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2005

If the commander is clearly enjoying himself, commanding his unit, that begins to wash off on the other people. If he creates situations where people can join in and have fun, where he jollies them along and they have a laugh about certain things, then they don't see their boss always with a long face, getting ratty and nervous. It is important for him to tell others "look, we fly this wonderful aeroplane, we should be enjoying every single sortie that we fly, getting the most from it and, when we are not doing that let's spend some time together. You've got to spend time with your family they'll expect that, but lets do one or two Squadron things, lets really have some fun". The leader can engender esprit de corps for his unit by presenting them with fun opportunities and creating a positive atmosphere. You have to work harder at this now than was needed with my generation. I joined the Air Force not long after the Second World War and patriotism was something that came quite naturally to people, and the achievements of the Royal Air Force during the Second World War were fresh in

people's minds so when you joined a Squadron it had real esprit de corps from that. I think you have to work a lot harder in the Royal Air Force today to get that sense of belonging.



Sergeant Stephen MARCUS

**Second In Command, Incident Response Team (IRT), Operation
TELIC, 2007**

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

I arrived during the time when the camp was being mortared a lot, this had a huge effect on morale. Initially I was Second In Command of IRT and after a few months became the Commander. One member of the Team, a young senior aircraftsman, had made it obvious that he did not want to be there. His wife had recently given birth and the thought of not returning from theatre played on his mind. He was becoming increasingly paranoid of being hit by Indirect Fire (IDF); which was having a detrimental effect on the rest of the Team. I tried to counsel him on a number of occasions, but to no avail. Shortly after the deaths of three personnel in the accommodation block, another IDF attack happened. The medic sustained a minor injury to his arm, another medic with him was hit harder from the attack. It was assessed that the medic was medically fit to continue work after a day. I am used to dealing with people that are scared, that is part of my job, but the medic was getting more and more introvert and I could no longer say that 'it will be okay'. It reached a point that it was having such a detrimental effect on the Team I had to change my strategy for dealing with him; I took a firm hand and no longer allowed him to feel sorry for himself. The medic did respond to this and to his credit got on with it. Towards the end of the detachment the mortars had stopped. I knew that the Team would yet again be hit by low morale due to the amount of spare time they had and therefore led a training package, organising different scenarios, to not only keep the staff busy but to also make sure that they remained on high readiness. It was very important for me to learn to change techniques when dealing with individuals because a style may work for one but not for the other.



COMMAND, MISSION COMMAND

Strange as it sounds, great leaders gain authority by giving it away.

Vice Admiral James STOCKDALE
US Navy, 1987

*A leader is best when he is neither seen nor heard. Not so good when he is adored and glorified. Worst when he is hated and despised. Fail to honour people, they will fail to honour you. But of a great leader, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, the people will all say,
We did this ourselves.*

Lao TZU, c600 BC
Chinese Taoist Philosopher



General Sir Peter DE LA BILLIERE

On SAS command during the period 1959-60

From *Looking for Trouble*, 1994

In the SAS I had found that the delegation of responsibility to the lowest possible level produces results out of all proportion to the risks involved in letting junior people have a measure of independence and authority. At the same time, I had seen that you cannot simply delegate without knowing your people: you must make sure that you have people whom you trust, and who trust and can work with you. Furthermore, a leader must obviously lead by example, and with knowledge: the man on the Bren gun, for instance, does not expect his commander to be better on the gun than he is, but he does expect him to know its capabilities and limitations, so that he, the gunner, is not given tasks which are beyond him and his weapon.

Clearly in any military organization there must be an element of discipline and authority, and these should be based on firmness, fairness and understanding; but experience had taught me that the best kind of discipline is self-discipline, when a commander instils into his men the will to do things, which they want to see done well, because they have been given the responsibility for carrying them out. Anyone delegating in this way has to take risks. Some of your people may let you down, and some may make mistakes; but if they do blunder, you must be prepared to back them. If you jump on them every time something goes wrong, they decline to commit themselves next time round, and you never create the mutual trust essential in achieving self-discipline.



Edgar VINCENT

Comment on Admiral Viscount Horatio Nelson

From a paper, *Nelson and Mission Command*, 2004

Admiral Horatio Nelson's 19th Century adoption of devolving responsibility to his Captains to achieve success in Battle, which was a major development in maritime warfare at that time.

In command of a squadron charged with finding and destroying the French fleet that had sailed from Toulon, Nelson set out to do things very differently [to the accepted *modus operandi* at that time]. His Flag Captain, Edward Berry, recorded the process and concluded, "With the masterly ideas of their Admiral, therefore, on the subject of Naval tactics, every one of the Captains of his Squadron was most thoroughly acquainted, and upon surveying the position of the Enemy, they could ascertain with precision what were the ideas and intentions of their Commander without the aid of further instruction, by which means signals became almost unnecessary".

We should not imagine that Nelson's mind was a blank sheet of paper or that he was hoping for strategy to evolve from a process of 'group think' or brainstorming, or that careful plans were then drawn up to meet every conceivable set of circumstances. None of this was in Nelson's nature. He knew what he wanted to achieve; his intention was to enable and empower his captains to deliver it. Having formed his concepts, he set about selling them in a process which enabled each of his captains to discuss and contribute to the extent of his talents, but at least to understand the battle plan. Like Montgomery, Nelson knew that it was the prime responsibility of the commander himself to invent the strategy.

We can be certain that he concentrated not on detailed plans for each of a wide range of hypothetical circumstances, but on the principles he saw as applicable in all circumstances. These were likely to have been simple. Forget the formal Order of Battle, we shall form up as most convenient at the time. We shall immediately attack the enemy and immediately get close to our target. We shall concentrate our whole force on one or two parts of the enemy, two of our ships to every one of his. We shall aim first for a knock-out blow and then a mopping-up operation. We must be prepared with anchors to hold positions and distinguishing lights for night actions.

If Nelson could succeed in implanting such a simple but clear framework of intentions in the minds of his captains and could then debate their own reactions, their 'what ifs,' 'hows,' their 'suppose we encounter them thus,' their minds would be prepared. Nelson's intentions would become their own.

At the Nile, close to sunset, there was no hesitation. Nelson went straight for the enemy, signalling his intention to concentrate on the van and the centre. His tactic of two ships against one was instantly upgraded when Thomas Foley, in the leading ship, saw that he could get round to the inner and unprepared side of the French line. Four more captains had the skill and discipline to extemporise on Foley's initiative and follow him round without causing a logjam. The French van was doomed by this encirclement. Driven by Nelson's simple ideas, unleashed by his transfer of responsibility to individuals, it was a brilliant combination of individual talent and team effort. And we must remember that Nelson was on deck for only an hour and a half of the first eight and a half hour phase of a battle that lasted until noon the following day. He literally could not, in today's naval jargon, 'micromanage' the battle. Indeed, after his opening gambit the Nile was neither commanded nor directed, especially after darkness fell. It was a wonderfully successful example of Mission Command.

The supreme test comes if the commander is killed. Do his subordinates lose the plot? At Trafalgar Nelson was carried below less than an hour after Victory opened fire; the battle would last for another three hours and twenty minutes. Again, what he did before the battle was evidently of far greater importance than what he did during it. Again he had sold his plan to his captains. His overall aim was annihilation of the enemy. His strategy involved a headlong two-pronged assault, destroying the enemy's rear with a force never less than a quarter stronger, an overpowering of its centre and readiness to meet counter-attack from the van; above all, there was to be a fight at close quarters, hence his words on contingencies: "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy".

Nelson had adopted a strategy whereby his ships had to seek out the enemy and fight. This time he issued a memorandum making his intentions clear, and he publicly delegated command of one line to Vice-Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood. His officers were enthralled by the level of trust he placed in them, but it was the clarity of his intention, the opening of his mind to them, his personal leadership and reputation that provided the foundation of their confidence, even though there were those who rightly judged that his headlong assault, exposing his leading ships to enemy fire without possibility of reply, would be very risky and possibly costly. In this battle courage was not an essential difference between the two sides... The greatest single factor that enabled courage, seamanship and gunnery to reap their dividend in the scale of the victory was that Nelson's captains knew what was expected of them and delivered it.



Pearl WITHERINGTON

Special Operations Executive Circuit Leader during WWII

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2005

The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was established in 1940 as the British government considered how they could help the people of the occupied countries of Europe to resist Nazi oppression. Lord Halifax suggested:

“ new organisation to co-ordinate, inspire, control and assist the nationals of the oppressed countries who must themselves be the direct participants.”

Operatives were sent to countries which they knew well, to assist the local resistance organisations. Some became circuit leaders with the responsibility for co-ordinating resistance activity in particular regions. All operatives were trained in the skills of sabotage, wireless operation and living constantly under an assumed identity.

From 1942, women were recruited to become SOE operatives as it was argued they would be less likely to attract suspicion. The only female circuit leader in SOE history was a woman called Pearl Witherington. In 1944 she became leader of the Wrestler Network, which covered an area in central France the size of Wales.

Pearl had grown up in France, she was bilingual and had worked as a member of the RAF staff at the British Embassy in Paris before the German occupation. She then escaped with her mother and sisters to London via Marseille and Lisbon. After only a few weeks in England, she was keen to get back to France in any way she could and asked her boss at the Air Ministry if he could help. He arranged for Pearl to be considered for the SOE and she soon began her training which lasted for fourteen weeks. She was then parachuted into France, initially to act as a courier passing messages between different cells of the Resistance. Under the ruse of being a beauty consultant, she travelled under the noses of the Germans, principally at night, on unheated trains, to remote rural villages and, for security reasons, she kept all information in her head. On one occasion she cycled 50 miles, fording the wide River Cher with her cycle on her shoulders, to deliver a message. On arrival in the town, she spotted a familiar car registration and realised the operation had been compromised so she simply turned round and cycled home; via the river, of course!

In May 1944 the leader of the Wrestler Network, Maurice Southgate, was arrested by the Gestapo and it was then that Pearl took responsibility for 1,500 members of the Maquis (Resistance) in her area. At this stage of the war there was a price on her head but, rather than returning to the safety of England, Pearl continued her dangerous work. She set about re-organising and dividing the area into smaller cells in preparation for the D-Day landings. The entire system was reliant on a totally

decentralised control. Each cell had to be responsible for organising its own activities with the general purpose of disrupting German lines of communication. Pearl, as circuit leader, offered advice and distributed supplies, co-ordinated some offensive actions, whilst continuing with the passing of information. She had to act on her own initiative having only limited contact with, and direction from, London. Pearl was often only able to spend a few nights in each place without risk of discovery. At one time she was hiding in the attic space of a barn when the Germans began to storm the village. She gathered together her few possessions and escaped, taking shelter deep in the forest from where she had to run operations for the next few weeks.

The serious work of disrupting German communications started on the 11th June 1944. That day a company of German soldiers approached the chateau in which she and her fiancé were hiding. He decided to take a pot shot at them and killed one; the soldiers then attacked the chateau. Most people might have bolted at this point but Pearl ran back to the chateau, uncovered the arms cache, started loading the weapons and putting detonators into the grenades. Only at the last moment did she escape to hide in a corn field, spending the whole day under a blazing sun, being able to move only when the wind disturbed the crop.

The difficulties of running a dispersed and informal military organisation whilst living under cover and being constantly on the move to escape from the Germans, combined with extremely poor communications between cells, are difficult to comprehend. In the immediate run up to the D-Day landings the sabotage carried out by the Maquis under Pearl's control, had an enormous impact on the ability of the Germans to reinforce to the Normandy area. This SOE concept of operations illustrates very well the effectiveness of using the principles of mission command to overcome the difficulties of the 'fog and friction of war'. It is also a remarkable example of bravery, of determination and, of the importance of trust in leadership in bringing about success in the most extreme circumstances, against overwhelming odds.



Captain Basil LIDDELL-HART

Military commentator and correspondent

From *Thoughts on War*, 1944

Today therefore a commander must ensure that his troops always know what they are being asked to do, and how that fits in with the larger plan. I have always insisted that before a battle the essentials of the plan are known right through the chain of command, and finally down to the rank and file. The troops must know how a commander is going to fight the battle and what part they are to play in it; this must be explained to them by word of mouth, for that counts far more than the written word.



Major General Lewis MacKENZIE Canadian Army

Chief of Staff UNPROFOR, Sarajevo

From *Peacekeeper – The Road to Sarajevo*, 1992

I visited one location on the afternoon of July 30 where there was a major minefield operation underway, controlled by our engineers. I crawled into the back of one of our Armoured Personnel Carriers that was being used as the command post for the operation. Sitting in front of a large map was a Canadian Master Corporal with two radios. I asked him, “Who are you talking to?” He replied, “Well, sir, I have a Croatian Colonel on this side and a Serbian Lieutenant-Colonel on the other”. “And you are controlling the operation by telling them what to do?” “Yes Sir.”

To me that said it all about the quality of the soldiers we manage to attract and keep in the Canadian Armed Forces. Here was a young man trained on the first rung of the leadership ladder as a Master Corporal, and he was totally at ease and confident while controlling two foreign colonels in a complex and dangerous operation.



Field Marshal Sir Bernard MONTGOMERY

Commander Eighth Army and Allied Ground Forces Commander,
Operation OVERLORD

From Lecture on Military Leadership given at The University of St Andrews, November 1945

...a leader must know very clearly what he wants himself; he must see his objective clearly and must go all out for it; he must let everyone else know what he wants, and what are the basic fundamentals of his policy. He must in fact give firm guidance and a clear lead; it will be necessary for him to create what I call 'atmosphere', and in that atmosphere his subordinate commanders and troops will live and work. To do this he will have to take a very firm grip on his military machine from the top; only in this way will his force acquire balance and cohesion and so develop its full fighting potential. History has many examples of a lack of grip being taken by a commander; with the result that he failed to develop the power of which his force was capable, and so met disaster.

Having laid down the basic fundamentals of his policy, a commander must place complete trust in his subordinates and must give them freedom to carry out that policy within the framework which he has laid down. He must be prepared to decentralize, and to trust his subordinates to use their own initiative on all matters of detail. The commander himself must stand back from the detail, so that he can see clearly the essentials of the problem, and make sure that correct action is being taken on those essentials. If ever a commander allows himself to become too greatly immersed in the unimportant details of any problem, then he will fail to see the essentials clearly. It is obvious that he must be a good judge of men, and a good chooser of subordinates; he must also have the 'drive' to get things done.



Reverend (Wing Commander) Jonathan CHAFFEY

Royal Air Force College Chaplain, Royal Air Force Cranwell

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2004

In leadership I want someone who maintains a vision without being stuck in details, who, even in the midst of great detail, keeps a bigger vision. A key element of leadership is articulating that vision so that the whole team moves forward with a shared vision. You have done your job as a leader if every member of your team owns the vision; it is a far more effective way of operating than cajoling and persuading.

Flight Lieutenant John MOTLEY

Officer Commanding Operations Flight, 2 Mechanical Transport (MT)
Squadron, Gulf War 2

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2004

The nature of deployed MT convoy operations means that we devolve responsibility down to the convoy commanders on a daily basis because, once they are out on a mission, they are on their own. On Operation TELIC in particular they often had no means of communicating back to the HQ and, as such, we had to ensure that convoy commanders knew all the details about the mission and what was required – it was far more than just driving. You had to trust their abilities and what they could do but also, mission command as an idea works only as long as the mission is achievable by the individual you are sending. You would never send someone that it is going to be fazed by a set of problems they might face; you would always try to use an appropriate person to an appropriate mission. Having said that, we had some junior ranks taking on a lot of responsibility on a number of occasions and, having been trusted with that responsibility, all rose to the challenge admirably.

Explanation of the mission was key, because there were several times when unpopular decisions were being made, and the orders that fell out of these decisions had to be put to the Squadron in such a way that they understood the purpose for tasks to get them to commit wholeheartedly to those tasks. There were a few occasions when I acted as convoy commander and went with them because they needed an example to follow. Circumstances sometimes created a greater ambiguity in the purpose of the mission in their eyes and so, in the interests of maintaining the mutual trust between me as flight commander and my drivers, I had to lead by example on those occasions. Seeing me present in the most confusing and challenging environments helped to keep a high level of trust, because they had to know that I had their best interests at heart at all times.



Group Captain Michael NEVILLE

Officer Commanding Royal Air Force Lyneham, 2009

Extract from paper *Leadership Under Fire – Iraq 2006/2007*

...leadership is not about one man at the top it must be entirely pervasive throughout the command and everybody must accept the responsibilities that come with such an approach.

Air Vice-Marshal David WALKER

Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, 2003

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2005

The difference between command at squadron level and command at higher levels within the Royal Air Force is one of span and simplicity, nothing more. At squadron level, it is relatively easy to identify the unifying purpose for that unit and then to align everybody within the unit to that purpose. At station level, whilst you have a wide range of imperatives on you as the station commander, at the end of the day the task is the same and the purpose for the station binds everyone together. At a higher level of command you do not have the ability to walk the bounds of your area of responsibility so easily. On a station or squadron it is easier for people to see the value that you add to day to day life and you can demonstrate your worth in their immediate environment, at higher levels of command, this is much more difficult. And so the differences in command at varying levels represent a paradox: the qualities and attributes that are required are the same at all levels, however, the mechanisms used to deliver that command must be entirely different.



Flight Sergeant George VASEY

Senior Non-Commissioned Officer, Engineering Support, Royal Air Force Spadeadam

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

You manage your resources - team, time, whatever that may be when things are going well, you lead when things go wrong.



Senior Aircraftswoman Marie WHITE

Driver, 2 Mechanical Transport (MT) Squadron and Packet

Commander, Gulf War 2

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2004

I really enjoyed acting as packet commander (a small convoy of four or five vehicles); once I knew the routes I was given more responsibility, which was good, because it was something, I'd never done before. We were also put in charge of the locally employed civilians and took them out in their own trucks on convoys and had to look after them. The language barrier at the Army camps meant you had to take them and feed them and make sure you had them all coming back and that was really good. We had Army escorts as well, we used to take the convoys to the borders and to Kuwait, we had to unload them and load them back up again to come back on our own so it was excellent responsibility to do that and I'm just an senior aircraftsman.

The most difficult incident I had to deal with was when we had civilians with us and we were going into Basra, led by an Army captain whose map reading skills were a bit sketchy; we ended up going in towards a hostile village and of course all the civilians started to panic because they didn't have any weapons. We ended up down in a ravine going the wrong way up the road. That was quite unnerving but it was our responsibility as packet commanders to make sure the civilians were alright in their cabs because they were all shouting and panicking. I never thought I'd be able to do that, but having been given the chance and proving to myself that I can do it, gave me a lot more confidence and I think it's given a lot of other lower ranks more confidence in themselves. It's made me think that anyone can be a good leader put in the right position, in the right situation and given a chance.



Air Chief Marshal Sir Paddy HINE

On creating and selling a vision

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2005

Senior commanders have always got scope to bring in their own vision of the way in which they want to take their unit forward. There is normally quite a lot of scope there for initiating change which is going to improve the efficiency of the Unit and we need innovators as commanders. But they must put effort into selling the vision of the way forward, as they see it, to the rest of their unit.

Fifty years ago the boss could say “Now listen boy, you may not like it but I’ve decided we’re going to do it and I’m your boss, so do it,” and it would probably get done. Today that doesn’t work, you will lose credibility if you stand up and say “you’ll do as I say,” you must make a reasoned explanation for why that is the way forward and convince your team that that is the case. So good leadership today depends on convincing explanations, persuasion, earning respect and confidence and getting people to ‘buy in’ to ideas.



LEADERSHIP ATTRIBUTES

The revised Leadership Attributes read to me as the overall ingredients for a good leader, but the majority are qualities that every person in the Royal Air Force should possess; from air chief marshal down to a recruit in Phase One Training. The order in which they're set is poignant by having Warfighter, Courageous first. Although conflict is no stranger to us, it has escalated to the point where we have had to make it our precedence. The last attribute focuses on tomorrow's recruit which builds confidence that the Royal Air Force is not stuck in yesterday. It is encouraging to see that new ideas and perspectives are valued for without these, the Royal Air Force could not move forward.

Senior Aircraftswoman Juliette LEWIS

Discrepancy Clerk, Supply Control Accounting Section, Royal Air Force Wittering
Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert BROOKE-POPHAM

Commander in Chief Far East, 1942

From a paper, *Duties of an Officer*, 1943

The spiritual factors, sense of duty and service, loyalty and sincerity, have themselves one and the same basis, namely unselfishness. So if we are to become good leaders the first step is to develop this aspect of our character.

Never forget that loyalty is two-way, if you expect loyalty from those under you, you must first be loyal to them and set them an example by your attitude to your own superiors.

It is essential that men shall have complete confidence that you will always keep faith with them and that they will always get from you a square deal...it means a scrupulous fairness that looks deeper than the purely legal aspect.

Be strictly impartial, nothing undermines authority more than the belief that an officer has favourites and treats some people more leniently than others for mere personal reasons. Always be natural, don't ape the idiosyncrasies of others but use their example for improving your own qualities and as a guide to your own actions. Don't surrender to the incense of popularity or make yourself cheap in order to court it; sincerity, sympathy and efficiency will go a long way towards earning something far more valuable than popularity – respect and affection.

In the case of an officer, compliance with orders means more than obedience to the letter... Whilst a matter is under consideration an officer is entitled to express his own views, say at a conference. But once the responsible commander has reached a decision, an officer must sink his own opinions and make that decision his own.

And bear in mind that if your subordinates misunderstand your order, it is probably due to the fact that you have failed to see things from their point of view and so have not made your meaning and intentions sufficiently clear.



Air Vice-Marshal J R WALKER

On the essential attributes of a leader

From *Royal United Services Institute lecture*, 1984

So what do I look for in my leader?

Above all, he must be professionally competent. He must know his business, and at some time in his career he must have demonstrated that he is as good at it as I am – and preferably a great deal better. I want a leader who, to paraphrase Bonar Law, does not have to “hasten after me”. The modern fighting man will not willingly follow a fool, nor should the system require him to do so.

Then I look for someone who is a ‘people’ man – a man who is thrifty with his men's toil in peace, and with their skins in war. Those who talk of the ‘manpower resource,’ or that phrase (which should be banned in any unit worth its salt) ‘man management’ – then let them manage the inanimate to their hearts content, but let them keep away from people. This is not to say that ‘people’ leaders are cuddlesome softies; a commander's primary responsibility to his men is to ensure that, by hard and realistic preparation, they have the maximum chance of winning – and thereby living through – any conflict.

I demand of my leader a wholehearted belief in the cause, whatever that may be at the time – for without it he cannot show the enthusiasm for the grand purpose, which has to be in the infectious fever of a top-class unit.

Finally, in a mercifully short list, I want a winner. Field Marshal Slim said that a “Commander has failed in his duty if he has not won victory – for that is his duty. He has no other comparable to it”. And, of course, he is right. It does not matter whether it is the inter-squadron skittles, a tactical evaluation or World War Three, we are not in the business of coming second. And if any team continues to come second, then one day the captain will run out on the pitch by himself. A good loser is a consistent loser.

How do you find these leaders? What is that indeterminable factor, the intangible, the unknown, which makes one man a manager and the other a leader? I believe T. E. Lawrence's comments on tactics can be applied equally to the matter of leadership. And how well he put it when he said that: “Nine-tenths of tactics are certain and taught in books, but the irrational tenth is like the Kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals”.



WARFIGHTER, COURAGEOUS

All our personnel, commissioned or non-commissioned must be, first and foremost, warfighters and second specialists, though they may be second to none in their specialisation. The distinction between the front line and the support area will become increasingly blurred and all of us need to be military minded and of a determined fighting spirit to overcome the adversity of circumstances that any of us may face on operations. Physical courage is expected of all leaders, as far as each is able to give, but we must nurture moral courage to do the right thing.

Major-General Carl von CLAUSEWITZ

From *On War*, 1832

Courage in face of personal danger is also of two kinds. It may be indifference to danger, which could be due to the individual's constitution, or to his holding life cheap, or to habit. In any case, it must be regarded as a permanent condition. Alternatively, courage may result from such positive motives as ambition, patriotism, or enthusiasm of any kind. In that case courage is feeling, an emotion, not a permanent state.

These two kinds of courage act in different ways. The first is the more dependable; having become second nature, it will never fail. The other will often achieve more. There is more reliability in the first kind, more boldness in the second. The first leaves the mind calmer; the second tends to stimulate, but it can also be blind. The highest form of courage is a compound of both.



Captain Cecil LEWIS

Fighter Ace of WWI, Royal Flying Corps

From *Sagittarius Rising*, 1936

A squadron at last! But, 2c's. . . . That meant artillery observation, dawdling up and down the lines while Archie (the common slang for an Anti-Aircraft Battery) took pot shots at you; that meant photography; that meant beastly long reconnaissance, with Fokkers buzzing about on your tail. The obscure future date on which I should at last go into action had always been remote in my mind, imperfectly realized, even, I suspect, deliberately shut out. Now, suddenly, with a brief order, it had become startlingly clear and close at hand. For months after, with a few brief moments of respite, I was to live hypnotized not so much by the dread of death – for death, like the sun, is a thing you cannot look at steadily for long – as by the menace of the unforeseen. Friends, Mess companions, would go out on patrol and never come back. Archie, hostile aircraft, and machine-gun fire from the ground all took their toll. As the months went by it seemed only a matter of time until your turn came. You sat down to dinner faced by the empty chairs of men you had laughed and joked with at lunch. They were gone.

The next day new men would laugh and joke from those chairs. Some might be lucky and stick it for a bit, some chairs would be empty again very soon. And so it would go on. And always, miraculously, you were still there. Until tomorrow...In such an atmosphere you grew fatalistic, and as time went by and left you unscathed, like a batsman who has played himself in, you began to take liberties with the bowling. You took unnecessary risks, you volunteered for dangerous jobs, you provoked enemy aircraft to attack you. You were invulnerable: nothing could touch you. Then, when one of the old hands, as seemingly invulnerable as yourself, went West, you suddenly got cold feet. It wasn't possible to be sure - even of yourself. At this stage it required most courage to go on, a sort of plodding fatalism, a determination, a cold-blooded effort of will. And always alone! No friends right and left, no crowd morale. The lot of the P.B.I. (Poor Bloody Infantry) was hopeless enough; but each in his extremity had at least some one at hand, some one to cheer and to succour.

Besides, we were always at the mercy of the fragility of the machine and the unreliability of the engine. One chance bullet from the ground might cut a thin wire, put the machine out of control, and send us, perfectly whole, plunging to a crash we were powerless to prevent. So, in the later stages, we had to win victories over ourselves long before we won any over the enemy, for it was not impossible to turn back, to tell a lie – not always easy to verify – of faulty engine, bad visibility, jammed guns, and so stave off the inevitable for one day more. We came in for some admiration at that time, just because we were pilots, just because we flew. But flying is pleasurable enough, in short doses, and was even in those days reasonably safe. Truthfully, there was little admirable in that. But to fly on a straight line, taking photos of the enemy trenches, an easy Archie target, within range of the ground machine guns, bumped by the eddies of passing shells and pestered by enemy scouts, that required nerve. And it would have to be done twice a day, day after day, until you were hit or went home. Small wonder if, under this strain, pilots lived a wild life and wine and womanized to excess. Stanhope in *Journey's End* summarizes it perfectly: "to forget, you bloody little fool, to forget. Do you think there's no limit to what a man can bear?"



Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh DOWDING

Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command, 1940

A letter to the *Under Secretary for Air*, 16 May 1940

A letter to the Air Ministry to persuade them of the desperate case to retain Fighter Squadrons in the UK, rather than send them to the deteriorating situation on the Continent. Dowding had the moral courage to champion this deeply contentious cause at the highest levels.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the very serious calls, which have recently been made upon the Home Defence Fighter Units in an attempt to stem the German invasion on the Continent.

I hope and believe that our Armies may yet be victorious in France and Belgium, but we have to face the possibility that they may be defeated.

In this case I presume that there is no one who will deny that England should fight on, even though the remainder of the Continent of Europe is dominated by the Germans.

For this purpose it is necessary to retain some minimum fighter strength in this country and I must request that the Air Council will inform me what they consider this minimum strength to be, in order that I may make my dispositions accordingly.

I would remind the Air Council that the last estimate, which they made as to the force necessary to defend this country, was 52 Squadrons, and my strength has now been reduced to the equivalent of 36 squadrons.

Once a decision has been reached as to the limit on which the Air Council and the Cabinet are prepared to stake the existence of the country, it should be made clear to the Allied Commanders on the Continent that not a single aeroplane from Fighter Command beyond the limit will be sent across the Channel, no matter how desperate the situation may become.

It will, of course, be remembered that the estimate of 52 Squadrons was based on the assumption that the attack would come from the eastwards except in so far as the defences might be outflanked in flight. We have now to face the possibility that attacks may come from Spain or even from the North coast of France. The result is that our line is very much extended at the same time as our resources are reduced.

I must point out that within the last few days the equivalent of 10 Squadrons have been sent to France, that the Hurricane Squadrons remaining in this country are seriously depleted, and that the more Squadrons which are sent to France the higher will be the wastage and the more insistent the demands for reinforcements.

I must therefore request that as a matter of paramount urgency the Air Ministry will consider and decide what level of strength is to be left to the Fighter Command for the defences of this country, and will assure me that when this level has been reached, not one fighter will be sent across the Channel however urgent and insistent the appeals for help may be.

I believe that, if adequate fighter force is kept in this country, if the fleet remains in being, and if Home Forces are suitably organised to resist invasion, we should be able to carry on the war single handed for some time, if not indefinitely. But if the Home Defence Force is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the situation in France, defeat in France will involve the final, complete and irremediable defeat of this country.



Flight Sergeant George THOMPSON

Citation for Victoria Cross awarded for duties on IX Squadron, Bomber Command, 1945

This airman was the wireless operator in a Lancaster aircraft, which attacked the Dortmund-Ems Canal in daylight on the 1st January, 1945.

The bombs had just been released when a heavy shell hit the aircraft in front of the mid-upper turret. Fire broke out and dense smoke filled the fuselage. The nose of the aircraft was then hit and an in-rush of air, clearing the smoke, revealed a scene of utter devastation. Most of the perspex screen of the nose compartment had been shot away, gaping holes had been torn in the canopy above the pilot's head, the inter-communication wiring was severed, and there was a large hole in the floor of the aircraft. Bedding and other equipment were badly damaged or alight; one engine was on fire.

Flight Sergeant Thompson saw that the gunner was unconscious in the blazing mid-upper turret. Without hesitation he went down the fuselage into the fire and the exploding ammunition. He pulled the gunner from his turret and, edging his way round the hole in the floor, carried him away from the flames. With his bare hands, he extinguished the gunner's burning clothing. He himself sustained serious burns on his face, hands and legs.

Flight Sergeant Thompson then noticed that the rear gun turret was also on fire. Despite his own severe injuries he moved painfully to the rear of the fuselage where he found the rear gunner with his clothing alight, overcome by flames and fumes. A second time Flight Sergeant Thompson braved the flames. With great difficulty he extricated the helpless gunner and carried him clear. Again, he used his bare hands, already burnt, to beat out the flames on a comrade's clothing.

Flight Sergeant Thompson, by now almost exhausted, felt that his duty was not yet done. He must report the fate of the crew to the Captain. He made the perilous journey back through the burning fuselage, clinging to the sides with his burnt hands to get across the hole in the floor. The flow of cold air caused him intense pain and frostbite developed. So pitiful was his condition that his captain failed to recognise him. Still, his only concern was for the two gunners he had left in the rear of the aircraft. He was given such attention as was possible until a crash landing was made some forty minutes later.

When the aircraft was hit, Flight Sergeant Thompson might have devoted his efforts to quelling the fire and so have contributed to his own safety. He preferred to go through the fire to succour his comrades. He knew that he would then be in no position to hear or heed any order, which might be given to abandon aircraft. He hazarded his own

life in order to save the lives of others. Young in years and experience, his actions were those of a veteran.

Three weeks later Flight Sergeant Thompson died of his injuries. One of the gunners unfortunately also died, but the other owes his life to the superb gallantry of Flight Sergeant Thompson, whose signal courage and self-sacrifice will ever be an inspiration to the Service.



Sir Winston CHURCHILL
Prime Minister 1940 – 1945
From *War Speeches*, June 1940

“WARS ARE NOT WON BY EVACUATIONS”

...turning once again, and this time more generally, to the question of invasion, I would observe that there has never been a period in all these long centuries of which we boast when an absolute guarantee against invasion, still less against serious raids, could have been given to our people. In the days of Napoleon the same wind which would have carried his transports across the Channel might have driven away the blockading fleet. There was always the chance, and it is that chance which has excited and befooled the imaginations of many Continental tyrants. Many are the tales that are told. We are assured that novel methods will be adopted, and when we see the originality of malice, the ingenuity of aggression, which our enemy displays, we may certainly prepare ourselves for every kind of novel stratagem and every kind of brutal and treacherous manoeuvre. I think that no idea is so outlandish that it should not be considered and viewed with a searching, but at the same time, I hope, with a steady eye. We must never forget the solid assurances of sea-power and those which belong to air power if it can be locally exercised.

I have, myself full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone. At any rate, that is what we are going to try to do. That is the resolve of His Majesty's Government – every man of them. That is the will of Parliament and the nation. The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and in their need, will defend to the

death their native soil, aiding each other like good comrades to the utmost of their strength. Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until in God's good time, the new world, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.



Flight Lieutenant James NICOLSON

Citation for Victoria Cross awarded for duties in Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain, 1940

In recognition of most conspicuous bravery. During an engagement with the enemy near Southampton on 16th August, 1940, Flight Lieutenant Nicholson's aircraft was hit by four cannon shells, two of which wounded him whilst another set fire to the gravity tank. When about to abandon his aircraft owing to flames in the cockpit, he sighted an enemy fighter. This he attacked and shot down, although as a result of staying in his burning aircraft he sustained serious burns to his hands, face, neck and legs. Flight Lieutenant Nicolson has always displayed great enthusiasm for air fighting and this incident shows that he possesses courage and determination of a high order. By continuing to engage the enemy after he had been wounded and his aircraft set on fire, he displayed exceptional gallantry and disregard for the safety of his own life.

[The injuries that Flight Lieutenant Nicolson sustained brought him close to death; he had wounds in one eye and one foot and was so badly burned that the doctors gave up any hope of him recovering. However, his will-power saw him make a full recovery and he was keen to return to flying; his request was granted in 1941. The tenacity and courage that Nicolson displayed set a remarkable example to other fighter pilots. Whilst he was the only member of Fighter Command to receive the Victoria Cross during the Second World War, Nicolson's award is seen as being representative of the courage and example that many pilots in the Command achieved but, who were not observed in so doing, because they flew alone.]

Squadron Leader Beryl ESCOTT

Regarding an incident at Horsham-St-Faith in summer, 1942 involving Aircraftswoman (ACW) Williams, recounted by Section Officer Hodges
From *Women in Air Force Blue*, 1989

The duty driver for the fire tender that night was a small, blonde coal-miner's daughter, ACW Williams. Incendiary bombs were being rained down on top of the bomb dump, too high up, out of reach of the shovels and fire extinguishers of the [Royal Air Force] duty firemen, so that it seemed that the whole dump would explode at any moment. "Oh come on, do something", shouted Williams, and grabbing one of the special long-handled shovels, she scrambled up to the top of the stacked five-hundred pounders and, as fast as the incendiaries came, she whisked them, still flaming, down to the ground for the men to extinguish as they landed. The German aircraft continued circling around low and coming again and again with incendiaries.

When one of the men passed out, Williams jumped down off the dump between attacks to give him first aid but couldn't bring him round. So she drove the fire engine carefully over him, with its wheels on either side to give him cover. Then back up to the top of the bomb dump again to cope with more incendiaries. One of the firemen said "She looked like a proper little fairy up there dancing among the flames". Later she explained logically, "Well. They couldn't reach up there to put them out, could they?"



Sir Max HASTINGS

Comment on Group Captain Leonard Cheshire's leadership during WWII
From *Bomber Command*, 1979

For the first four months of 1943, 76 Squadron was commanded by Leonard Cheshire, another of the great British bomber pilots of the war, one of a quite different mould from Gibson, but even more remarkable. Cheshire, the son of a distinguished lawyer, also read law at Oxford, then joined the [Royal Air Force] shortly before the outbreak of war. In 1940 he began flying Witleys over Germany. By 1943, with two brilliant tours already behind him, he was a twenty six year old Wing Commander. There was a mystical air about him, as if he somehow inhabited another planet from those around

him, yet without affectation or pretension. “Chesh is crackers”, some people on the squadrons said freely in the days before this deceptively gentle, mild man became famous. They were all the more bewildered when he married and brought back from America in 1942 an actress fifteen years older than himself.

Yet Leonard Cheshire contributed perhaps more than any other single pilot to the legend of Bomber Command. He performed extraordinary feats of courage apparently on impulse, yet studied the techniques of bombing with intense perception and intelligence, later pioneering the first precision marking of the war as leader of 617 Squadron. At 76 Squadron there was a joke about Cheshire that, “the moment he walks into the bar, you can see him starting to work out how much explosive it would need to knock it down”. He was possibly not a natural flying genius in an aircraft like Micky Martin, but, by absolute dedication to his craft, he made himself a master. He flew almost every day. If he had been on leave and was due to operate that night, he would go up for two hours in the morning to restore his sense of absolute intimacy with his aircraft. He believed that to survive over Germany it was necessary to develop an auto-pilot within himself, which could fly the aircraft quite instinctively, leaving all his concentration free for the target and the enemy. As far back as 1941 he had written a paper on marking techniques. He was always an advocate of low-level bombing.

Cheshire himself wrote, “I loved flying and was a good pilot, because I threw myself heart and soul into the job. I found the dangers of battle exciting and exhilarating, so that war came easily to me”. Most of those he commanded knew themselves to be frailer flesh, and he dedicated himself to teaching them everything that he knew. He had never forgotten that Lofty, his own first pilot on Whitleys, taught him to know every detail of his aircraft, and he was determined to show others likewise. He lectured 76's crews on economical cruising heights, escape and evasion techniques, and methods of improving night vision. They knew that he was devoted to their interests. On a trip to Nuremberg they were detailed to cross the French coast at 2,000 feet. He simply told Group that he would not send them at that height. It would be 200 feet or 20,000. He made his point.



Squadron Leader E GIFFARD

From Royal Air Force Leadership Lectures, January 1944

Courage does not consist of not being afraid and there is a good deal of difference in meaning between the words courage, bravery and fearlessness. In reality if you are not afraid you cannot show courage for courage really consists of an effort of the will to overcome fear. It follows, therefore, that a man may show bravery without being really courageous - in fact in very many cases of outstanding personal bravery the individuals concerned acted under an impulse and without stopping to think of the consequences. This, whilst it does not belittle their actions or detract from those who, knowing full well the risks involved and being really afraid, nevertheless overcome their fear and do their duty just as if they were not afraid. In the first class of persons, that is to say those who exhibit a lion-hearted kind of fearlessness, may be numbered many of our VCs, whilst many others who gained that coveted decoration come properly into the other class, that is to say the class which shows courage in its purest form.

Both fearlessness and courage are qualities to be admired, but courage demands more of the will, and the man who overcomes a natural timidity or a deep-rooted fear is really more to be admired than the natural lion-heart, who, in exhibiting tremendous bravery is, after all, only obeying a natural impulse derived from his temperament. Another important difference between the bravery which is born of fearlessness and the courage which is born of the exercise of will, is that natural bravery is often associated with unreasonable aggressiveness and lack of restraint, whilst developed courage is often found to go hand in hand with an amiable disposition and considerable restraint.

Courage is something, which can be developed both in oneself and in others. Probably the most potent factors in the development of courage are the factors of example and self-respect. If men have before them examples of courage of the highest order they tend naturally to try to emulate that courage.



Field Marshal Viscount William SLIM of Burma

Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Governor General of Australia, 1953

From *Courage and Other Broadcasts*, 1957

Courage is the greatest of all virtues, for without it there are no other virtues. . . . Anyone can be brave for five minutes. You will not only be braver than the men you lead; you will be brave for longer. [As a Leader] You will go on being brave when others falter; brave not only in danger, but brave in hardship, in loneliness and, perhaps most difficult of all, in those long periods of inactivity, of boredom that come at times to all soldiers. In failure, too, you will show your courage. We can all be brave when we are winning. I'm a hell of a General when everybody is whooping along and the enemy's on the run. But you won't always be winning. If you had ever been a British General at the start of a war you would know what I mean. You'll find some day when things are bad, whether you're the Commanding General or the Platoon Commander, there will come a sudden pause when your men stop and look at you. No one will speak; they will just look at you – look at you and ask, dumbly, for leadership. Their courage is ebbing; you must make it flow back – and it is not easy. You will never have felt more alone in your life.



Colonel Harry MAIHAFFER

Regarding Captain Norman Schwarzkopf in Vietnam later General

Norman Schwarzkopf

From *Brave Decisions*, 1995

Captain Schwarzkopf studied the order that had just come down from higher headquarters and admired the staff work that apparently had gone into it, the order called for a mission in support of Major General Vinh Loc. A task force under Major Nghi (pronounced 'knee'), with Schwarzkopf as advisor, would attack to drive the Vietcong away from the South Vietnamese Special Forces camp at Duc Co, near the Cambodian border. According to the order, in forty-eight hours Nghi and his men would make a massive helicopter assault, using a landing zone (LZ) seven miles from Duc Co after a preparatory twenty-minute air strike; that was good: no one wanted a 'hot' LZ (one under enemy fire).

Once on the ground, the order said, the task force would be supported by 'all available' artillery. Moving on foot to the Cambodian border, and under cover of a fighter-bomber 'air cap,' they would then swing in a wide arc around Duc Co. This should allow them to pinch off the guerrillas, whose strength was an estimated two battalions, about 700 men. Nghi's force should be adequate for the job, but as an added precaution, a South Vietnamese Ranger battalion would be standing by to help if needed. Schwarzkopf, as his designated advisor, was determined to give Nghi the fullest possible support.

Together, Schwarzkopf and the Major went over the operations order, planning how they would implement it. After working through much of the night, they decided they had a solid and workable tactical plan. Next morning, with less than twenty-four hours remaining before the scheduled assault, Nghi began to brief his commanders, Schwarzkopf decided to double-check various elements of the plan.

[The] first step was flying to Duc Co to check out the landing zone, Schwarzkopf showed the pilot the clearing they'd be using flying low to keep from attracting any ground fire. They came over the spot designated as the landing zone. Looking down, Schwarzkopf saw only trees where the clearing should have been. He rechecked his map. There must be a mistake; the clear area designated as an LZ was nowhere to be seen; Schwarzkopf asked the pilot to keep circling until they found a suitable LZ. Finally they found an alternate site, about, fifteen miles the other side of Duc Co. The change in LZ site meant the timing of the whole operation would also have to change. Back on the ground, Schwarzkopf went to the air section at General Vinh Loc's headquarters to coordinate the air strike. The man at the desk, giving him a blank look, said: "We don't know anything about an operation at Duc Co". Schwarzkopf took out the operations order and pointed out the paragraph indicating a twenty-minute preparation, but the man insisted they'd never received any such request and said, "if you're going tomorrow, you won't have any air, because we need forty-eight hours to line up the planes".

Schwarzkopf began getting a sinking feeling in his stomach. Well, if there was no air, he'd better get busy and line up lots of artillery support. He hurried to the office of the fire support coordinator, showed the operations order to the two men on duty and explained how crucial fire support would be. "What artillery is in that area?" he asked. The men began to laugh. One of them said: "Do you know what 'available' artillery is? There's one mortar tube within the special forces camp!" The second man, grinning, chimed in: "And they have only twenty rounds of ammo left!"

Back at Pleiku, he went into the snack bar to cool off and there received what appeared to be the first bit of good luck. At a nearby table was Captain Paul Leckinger, a friend from Fort Benning days, and currently an advisor to the South Vietnamese Ranger battalion. Schwarzkopf told Leckinger about the mixed-up operations order and the

lack of artillery and air support. It made him appreciate the availability of the Vietnamese Rangers. “At least you’ll be there if we need you”, he said. Leckinger had the same blank look as the people at the air section. “What are you talking about? My battalion has just come back from three weeks in the field. We sent them all home to their villages for a break. We couldn’t get them back together in less than three or four days”. That hollowness in the stomach was turning more and more into a feeling of panic. This thing was shaping up as a real disaster. Schwarzkopf went looking for the task force commander. Major Nghi, a somewhat reluctant warrior at best, became visibly shaken when Schwarzkopf told what he’d found: no landing zone where it was supposed to be, no support from either air or artillery, no Ranger battalion standing by. It was now about seven pm, and they were supposed to start the attack the next morning. “What do you advise, Captain?” “Sir, I advise that we not go! We need a forty-eight hour delay to sort some of this out.” The Major quickly agreed.

Nghi first notified his parent unit, then he placed a call to General Vinh Loc whose headquarters had issued the order. Schwarzkopf sat down, he was beginning to feel a little better. Watching Nghi, however, it soon became clear the conversation was not going well. Even from across the room, he could hear Vinh Loc screaming at the hapless Nghi; [then] Nghi hung up the phone. In a subdued voice, he said they wanted to see Nghi and Schwarzkopf in person. Vinh Loc, according to Nghi, was a Vietnamese prince, a very powerful person [and] he was very, very angry.

Schwarzkopf and Nghi arrived at Vinh Loc’s place, an imposing colonial mansion in downtown Pleiku and they were ushered into a large marble-floored hall. General Vinh Loc sat in the centre, in the place of honour. Next to him was his American advisor, a full colonel. On either side were several Vietnamese generals and colonels, with their American advisors. Two straight chairs had been placed facing the dais. General Vinh Loc got right to the point. Looking menacingly at Major Nghi, and mincing no words, he shouted: “How dare you say you are not going to attack tomorrow?” Who, he wanted to know, was responsible for this outrage. Major Nghi, squirming, said that he was willing to attack but had requested a postponement on the advice of his American advisor, Captain Schwarzkopf. Vinh Loc turned to his own advisor, the American colonel, with a look, which seemed to imply that now he understood: This foul-up was all the fault of the Americans! The Colonel, clearly embarrassed, and not wanting to lose face before the Vietnamese, glared at Schwarzkopf. “Captain, how dare you tell them not to attack.” Schwarzkopf, trying to sound calm, explained that despite what it said in the operations order, they had neither air nor artillery support, nor did they have a reserve. Moreover, they’d had to switch to a new landing zone, which meant they didn’t even have a proper ground tactical plan. Schwarzkopf had been in Vietnam only a month and a half, and this was his first time in combat. Obviously the colonel thought he had no right to question any orders from a higher headquarters.

The Colonel was livid. He went into a tirade, lashing out at Schwarzkopf and his impertinence, at one point telling him he was an embarrassment to the American Army. Schwarzkopf said he still felt the attack should be postponed, at which the Colonel replied that Schwarzkopf was obviously unsuited for the job, and he therefore should consider himself relieved of his duties. [Schwarzkopf] knew that an officer, who was relieved from a job, particularly during combat, could kiss his career good-bye. Nevertheless, he felt sure he was right, and despite the bullying, he stood his ground and told the colonel that was an improper order. The only one who could relieve him was his senior airborne advisor, Colonel Francis Naughton.

It was now nearly midnight, but somehow they managed to track down Colonel Naughton back in Saigon. Naughton listened to the Colonel, who spared no words as he told of his own outrage as well as that of General Vinh Loc. Then Naughton asked to speak to Schwarzkopf, he reminded everyone that this was a Vietnamese airborne unit under the operational control of Saigon. Next he said: "I Support Captain Schwarzkopf and my Vietnamese counterpart here supports Major Nghi. All we ask is a forty-eight-hour delay". With that, Schwarzkopf had become the most unpopular man in Pleiku.

Next morning, Colonel Naughton arrived at Vinh Loc's headquarters [but] meanwhile, the staff officers on hand, both American and Vietnamese, kept telling Schwarzkopf he was being overly concerned about "only a couple of measly VC battalions". Clearly they considered him to be a troublemaker, one they'd remember. Naughton looked over the plans, asked questions, and then announced that Schwarzkopf was right. The operation was postponed for seventy-two hours, much to the relief of Major Nghi and his under-the-gun advisor, they'd managed to forestall a potential military debacle.



General Sir Peter DE LA BILLIERE

Commander British Forces Middle East, Gulf War 1

From *Storm Command*, 1992

For the courage and skill of our Tornado crews, I had nothing but admiration. I saw that their bravery was of a quite exceptional order. The first of our people to go into action, they were also the first to break through the barrier of enemy resistance, ground-fire and missiles. Their aircraft had never been tested in war, and most of the crews had themselves never flown in anger. Now they were required to fly to the limits of survival not once or twice, but night after night – and to do that required sustained courage of a special kind. I admired particularly the leadership and fortitude shown by senior officers – the wing commanders and squadron leaders – who flew extra sorties and led from the front to set an example. Anyone who did that, taking on more missions than the call of duty demanded, deserved the highest commendation.

Their gallantry emerges shining from the citations for medals awarded after the war – and I hope that it will not seem invidious if I quote the example of Squadron Leader Nigel Risdale, of XV Squadron, who was in the forefront of the early Tornado raids. His citation for a Distinguished Flying Cross records that he “displayed exceptional fearlessness in making low-level attacks at night against heavily defended enemy airfields”:

Despite the extreme danger to himself and the other aircrews in his formation, he displayed great courage and coolness in leading and pressing home attacks to deliver JP233 bombs with outstanding accuracy ... (His) bravery and calmness have been an inspiration to all when other aircrew were lost in action ... By rising instantly to all the demands made of him, and through the exceptional results he achieved in confronting the enemy in the heart of his territory, he has shown himself to be a magnificent leader under fire.



Warrant Officer Andy PITTOCK

Recounting an incident at Kabul airbase in Afghanistan, where he was Chief Fire Officer during Operation VERITAS, 2002, awarded the Queen's Commendation for Bravery
Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2004

My section was responsible for providing for fire cover at Kabul, but a lot of our time was spent on non-fire duties - force protection and guarding issues and so on. The setup at Kabul had a military area and a non-military side but the fire section was located next to the non-military activity. On the day in question a situation had been brewing throughout that day as no commercial aircraft had taken off for the past few days and a crowd of people had gathered on the dispersal and were becoming very agitated. Late on in the day the Minister for Transport and his aide had been shown to an aircraft that was ready to depart and the crowd became very rowdy in response to this, firing into the air and shouting. They crowded round the aircraft, which already had its engines running, and then a few of them managed to break into it, attacking and killing the Minister for Transport and throwing his body in the back of a taxi. On seeing this, his aide and another man began running away across the dispersal pursued by the rioters. All this activity was taking place outside our area of responsibility and I had received orders in the build up of the situation that we were not to get involved but, as the events escalated and the crowd moved closer towards us, I saw that action was necessary.

I formed my manpower into a line and although we were only twelve people, we were of course armed, and so immediately looked quite threatening. At that stage in my mind we were purely acting as a deterrent and guard for our area of responsibility, but fairly quickly the two men who were fleeing from the crowd saw us and started running towards us. I had to make a decision then and there as to what to do and, in my mind it stopped being a decision based on areas of responsibility, and became a moral decision where people's lives were at stake. I shouted orders to move forward, by this stage there was only about fifty feet between the crowd and us but we managed to surround the two men and get them to safety. I think the sight of, albeit a small number, but a group nevertheless, of military well disciplined personnel advancing in a well ordered manner was enough to ensure the safety of the two men in danger. The situation had the potential to escalate further and become quite nasty but once we moved forward in a decisive way, shouting orders and making a stance we were lucky and they backed down.



Group Captain Michael NEVILLE

Officer Commanding Royal Air Force Lyneham, 2009

Extract from paper *Leadership Under Fire – Iraq 2006/2007*

Some individuals felt it showed courage by standing up during a rocket attack and continuing with their socialising rather than adopting the correct preventative techniques; admittedly, there are times when on duty you have to ignore the risk and continue with the task in hand because the task is more important than the risk to the individual. These so called brave individuals were a danger to themselves and to the morale of the larger unit and were quickly reappraised of their responsibility. An incident I often quote applies directly to me and is one that I believe shows how well 903 Expeditionary Air Wing (EAW) had adapted to the hostile environment and to my leadership goals. I had introduced a local order within the 903 EAW accommodation lines to the effect that whilst in the Toucan Bar, on our 2-can per week social event, one could wear Combat Body Armour (CBA) unfastened with helmets carried. However, once outside the facility the CBA had to be fastened and helmets worn securely. I was leaving the bar one evening but had forgotten to do up my CBA or don my helmet. The 2 wing commanders accompanying me had adopted the correct dress standard but had not mentioned my oversight. A young senior aircraftsman approached me and reminded me of the dress regulations. To me, this was proof that my message about taking responsibility had reached all under my command. As for the 2 wing commanders who failed to warn me of my vulnerability to rocket attack, I can only assume that they were hoping for accelerated promotion in the case of my premature departure from theatre!



Sergeant John Taylor BAINBRIDGE

Operation TELIC, 2007

Awarded Queen's Commendation for Bravery, 2007

Sergeant Bainbridge's citation reads:

Sergeant Bainbridge is the Sergeant Direct Fire on Number 1 Squadron Royal Air Force Regiment and additionally was a watch keeper and reserve multiple patrol commander during the Squadron deployment to Iraq on Operation TELIC in 2007. On 19 July 2007, Sergeant Bainbridge was one of the first to the scene following the rocket attack on the B Flight accommodation, in which 3 of his Squadron colleagues

were killed. Within moments of the rocket strike, Sergeant Bainbridge had entered the accommodation and started to help with the evacuation of injured personnel. He then began fighting a fire that had taken hold in the ceiling, directly above a casualty. Having exhausted his fire extinguisher, he organised a human-chain to supply more extinguishers in order to fight the fire, and had to be constantly doused with water due to the intensity of the flames. Eventually, the fire was brought under control, and the casualty was saved, but Sergeant Bainbridge remained at the scene, helping to coordinate the rescue. For his courage and leadership in the face of intense personal danger, that undoubtedly saved the life of an injured comrade, Sergeant Bainbridge is awarded the Queen's Commendation for Bravery.



Thank god, I have done my duty.

Admiral Viscount Horatio NELSON
Trafalgar, 1805



EMOTIONALLY INTELLIGENT

Self-awareness and awareness of your team is one of the key foundations of effective leadership. Leaders who know themselves will be able to develop self-control and subsequently understand the needs of others. This will enable them to manage relationships at all levels better and remain calm under pressure. Thus individuals will be able to function as part of a wider team, invariably multidisciplinary, increasingly joint and often multinational, in the delivery of military capability.

*You must love soldiers in order to understand them, and understand them
in order to lead them.*

Marshal of France Vicomte de TURRENNE, 1611 – 1675



Margot MORRELL and Stephanie CAPPARELL

Writing about Sir Ernest Shackleton's Antarctic expedition, 1914
From *Shackleton's Way*, 2001

[He] developed a personal relationship with each crew member. He wanted his men to like and respect him as well as honour his position. His conversations never seemed contrived or staged to the men. Just as Shackleton always preferred face-to-face meetings with his backers, he liked to deal with his men one-to-one. No praise or condemnation was ever done through a middleman or in a circuitous way. Shackleton spoke with the highest and the lowest on his crew, finding some common ground on which to meet.

He was particularly solicitous of his men after they were frozen in and as the polar winter was drawing near – the sun set in May for four months. Most were experiencing the grim darkness for the first time, and Shackleton took pains to put them in the proper frame of mind to get through it.

Dr. Macklin, then twenty-four years old, said that when Shackleton came across a crewman walking alone, "he would get into conversation and talk to you in an intimate sort of way, asking you little things about yourself – how you were getting on, how you liked it, what particular side of the work you were enjoying most – all that sort of thing.....This communicativeness in Shackleton was one of the things his men valued in him; it was also, of course, a most effective way of establishing good relations with a very mixed company".

Shackleton liked to chat with his men in the quiet early morning hours when there was a particularly relaxed atmosphere. Raymond Priestley wrote about him aboard the *Nimrod*: "When everyone else had retired to bed, the night watchman was never surprised when Shackleton joined him for a half-hour's chat or to smoke a cigarette in the small hours before himself turning in".

All the crew had now was each other and the culture and camaraderie that Shackleton had laid as a foundation for their work. It was difficult enough when the ship got stuck and the men had to give up their most important work. Now, they had lost their workplace, their dreams of glory, and even their home. They needed encouragement. Shackleton stepped forward as they were settling into their tents for a second time. The Boss gathered the whole group around him and spoke to his men from the heart. He kept his message simple, gave a realistic appraisal of the situation, explained options, and offered a plan of action. He then thanked them for their efforts, and asked them for their support.

As he spoke, he appeared calm, confident, and strong. Years later, several of the men would recall how much his words meant to them at that time. “There was nothing of the nature of a set speech”, R.W. James recalled. “He spoke to us in a group, telling us that he intended to march the party across the ice to the west...that he thought we ought to manage five miles a day, and that if we all worked together it could be done. The necessity seemed obvious. At heart we were probably glad that the time of anxiety as to whether or not we should save the ship was over, and that the job was now up to us. I can’t remember the matter being discussed or argued in any way. We were in a mess, and the Boss was the man who could get us out. It is a measure of his leadership that this seemed almost axiomatic.”



General Sir Archibald WAVELL

Senior commander during WWII

From *Generals and Generalship*, 1941

Military history is a flesh and blood affair, not a matter of diagrams and formulas or of rules; not a conflict of machines, but of men. In the lecture hall of a French infantry school, which I once attended, was written the following from Ardant du Picq:

The man is the first weapon of battle: let us then study the soldier in battle, for it is he who brings reality to it. Only study of the past can give us a sense of reality, and show us how the soldier will fight in the future.

When you study military history don't read outlines on strategy or the principles of war. Read biographies, memoirs, and historical novels, such as ‘The Road to Glory’ or ‘Schönbrunn’. Get at the flesh and blood of it, not the skeleton. To learn that

Napoleon won the campaign of 1796 by manoeuvre on interior lines or some such phrase is of little value. If you can discover how a young unknown man inspired a ragged, mutinous half-starved army and made it fight, how he gave it the energy and momentum to march and fight as it did, how he dominated and controlled generals older and more experienced than himself, then you will have learnt something. Napoleon did not gain the position he did so much by a study of rules and strategy as by a profound knowledge of human nature in war. A story of him in his early days shows his knowledge of psychology. When an artillery officer at the siege of Toulon, he built a battery in such an exposed position that he was told he would never find men to hold it. He put up a placard, 'The battery of men without fear,' and it was always manned.



Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert BROOKE-POPHAM

Commander in Chief Far East, 1942

From a paper, *Duties of an Officer*, 1943

Knowing your men is essential, this means much more than keeping a card index, however elaborate; such a record will help, but carry the essentials of it in your head. Develop a memory for names and faces. As has been said "A man's name is to him the most important word in the English language" and few things give more satisfaction than to be remembered and addressed by name. This is often put down to a natural gift, actually it is far more a matter of taking a real interest in human beings; if one does that, one will soon find ways of noting some peculiarity in the man's features, his movements, or his voice, which one can connect in one's own mind with his name and hence will act as a reminder of it. We pay great attention to recognition of aircraft by their characteristics and it is just as important to do so with men.

Visit your men in hospital; join in their games or any rate be an enthusiastic spectator. Make every effort to understand your men's point of view; not necessarily in order to do what they want, but to ensure that you realise the effect on them of anything you may do or say.

Some men are gifted with a greater sympathy than others, but all can develop it. One of the outward signs is ability to associate names and faces, a matter not so much of memory as of interest in humanity. It is remarkable that many people today are better at recognising aeroplanes than man, yet man's features are more distinctive than the rudder or wings of aircraft.

All great leaders recognised and developed the best qualities of their men; Marlborough and Nelson knew this; the raw material with which they had to deal was rough, but they treated their men greatly and their men showed themselves great.



Field Marshal Erwin ROMMEL

Commander in Chief the Afrika Corps and Army Group West, WWII
From *The Rommel Papers*, 1953

There are always moments when the commander's place is not back with his staff but up with the troops. It is sheer nonsense to say that maintenance of the men's morale is the job of the battalion commander alone. The higher the rank, the greater the effect of their example. The men tend to feel no kind of contact with a commander who, they know, is sitting somewhere in headquarters. What they want is what might be termed a physical contact with him. In moments of panic, fatigue or disorganisation, or when something out of the ordinary has to be demanded from them, the personal example of the commander works wonders, especially if he has had the wit to create some sort of legend round himself. The physical demands on the troops [in Egypt, 1942] approached the limits of endurance. This placed a particular duty on the officers to provide a continual example and model for their men.



Captain Sir Basil LIDDELL-HART

Military commentator and correspondent
From *Thoughts on War*, 1944

A Commander should have a profound understanding of human nature, the knack of smoothing out troubles, the power of winning affection while communicating energy, and the capacity for ruthless determination where required by circumstances. He needs to generate an electrifying current, and to keep a cool head in applying it.



Sir Max HASTINGS

Comment on Group Captain Leonard Cheshire's leadership during WWII
From *Bomber Command*, 1979

A Commanding Officer who flew the most dangerous trips himself contributed immensely to morale – some officers were derisively christened 'Francois' for their habit of picking the easy French targets when they flew. Cheshire did not have his own crew – only Jock Hill, his wireless operator. Instead, he flew as 'Second Dickey' with the new and nervous. Perhaps the chief reason that 'Chesh' inspired such loyalty and respect was that he took the trouble to know and recognize every single man at Linton. It was no mean feat, learning five hundred or more faces which changed every week. Yet the ground crews chorused: "We are Cheshire cats!" because the CO spent so much of his day driving round the hangars and dispersals chatting to them and remembering exactly who had sciatica. It was the same with the aircrew,...they knew that when Cheshire flew, it was always the most difficult and dangerous operations. He would ask them to do nothing that he had not done himself.



Stephen BUNGAY

Regarding Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park and his leadership during WWII
From *The Most Dangerous Enemy – A History of the Battle of Britain*, 2000

In 1922, while at staff college, he wrote an insightful piece on the lessons of war, making four points: the need for aircraft dispersal on the ground; the need for fast ground-strafting aircraft keeping up continuous attacks in order to neutralise enemy airfields; the need for fighter-sweeps rather than close escort to establish control over airspace; and the need to appraise tactics thoroughly on the ground rather than leaving it to improvisation in the air. He was fortunate indeed that the Germans did not read these notes.

His competence was clear and he showed it. Like Dowding, he was very task-oriented, and he was ruthless with any he found wanting. He came across as a tough, no-nonsense character with a head for detail as well as the big picture. He was rational, questioning and independent-minded, and repeatedly demonstrated both physical and moral courage. Somewhat austere and stern, and regarded as ambitious, he was judged unreservedly by all who worked with him to embody the highest standards of integrity. Brought up a practising Christian, he retained his faith till the end of his life.

Some who met him found him vain and humourless, and thought him more respected than liked by his men. None of those who served under him whose comments have been recorded shared that view. He repeatedly showed how he could put quite junior people at their ease with his informality and humour and cared nothing for rank, which certainly put some people's backs up. He lacked the education and urbanity to be a popular colleague within the higher reaches of the RAF, and this was to become a problem for him. Several of his pilots, however, have said that they all worshipped him. When he was at Malta in 1942, he once stopped his car to give a lift to a humble fitter. "From my position, he was almost God!" his passenger has recalled, but a God "without a tribe of staff officers following, seeing for himself what was going on".

Park's skills as a team builder stemmed from his ability to communicate, and his demonstrated concern for the welfare of his men and women. He was a good listener, who showed he was listening and could express himself clearly and concisely, the sort of 'no-nonsense' talker pilots like. When faced with near-rebellion at a training depot in 1919, he quelled the discontent with a short, relaxed address given in a hangar. When his battered pilots returned from France in 1940, he went round to their airfields in his own Hurricane and told them they had done very well. Throughout the Battle of Britain he would leave his HQ every evening in his Hurricane which he named 'OK 1' and tour the airfields, especially those which had been hit. He came to listen, to discuss and to encourage. His men identified with him completely.

He knew that nature had not been generous enough to endow him with charisma, so he set about creating a charismatic image. Well before Montgomery tried similar things, he created some 'signatures' for himself to make him a recognisable character to his men. In 1940 it was 'OK 1' and the white overalls he always wore when flying her.

As a leader, however, Park, ... was the only one among his peers to regularly visit his men, talk to them, hear their views and keep them informed. The Public Record Office is full of documents he produced during the Battle: instructions to controllers, memos on tactics to unit commanders, full reports and messages of congratulations to units or stations which performed well. The volume of communications from him easily surpasses that of all the other Group Commanders put together. This has a real impact on the experience of the pilots.



Richard MORRIS

On Group Captain Leonard Cheshire's time as Squadron Commander of 76 Squadron

From *CHESHIRE: The biography of Leonard Cheshire VC OM, 2000*

Cheshire's informality suited men and women whose shared experience had begun to dissolve many of the class barriers which had divided the pre-war Air Force. For example:

A young wireless operator, who had arrived at Linton the previous day, was climbing into the truck for dispersals when he felt Cheshire's arm round his shoulder. "Good luck, Wilson." All the way to the aircraft, the W/Op pondered... "How the hell did the CO know my name?"

Or:

"Hello Read". I did not know he knew my name. "Hear you had a few problems tonight...Would you like to come and have a chat about it?" My first meeting with the nicest and most considerate squadron commander I ever met. It mattered not one iota that I was not in his squadron or his responsibility. "I needed help and advice and he was ready to give it."

His rapport with ground crews became legendary. "He could get men to do anything. If he went into a billet on a Saturday morning, with airmen getting ready to go into York, and ask for eight volunteers, he'd get the lot." He always believed he could learn more about the planes by talking to the ground staff than from 'other personnel.' Mechanics on engine stands grew accustomed to Cheshire climbing up beside them to discuss what they were doing and why. On Christmas Day two radar mechanics were inspecting Gee equipment in a Halifax on a remote dispersal: ...it seemed a good idea to get some fresh air after a few drinks on Christmas Eve. We heard someone going through the plane but took no notice as we assumed it was another mechanic. It was in fact Wg Cdr Cheshire who wished us "a very merry Christmas", had a few words with us and suggested we "jack it in for the day and get back for Christmas dinner." He did, in fact, go round the various dispersals on that Christmas morning and had a few words with everyone.



...If a commander thinks that all men are the same and he treats the great mass of human material accordingly, he will fail.

Field Marshal Sir Bernard L MONTGOMERY
Commander Eighth Army and Allied Ground Forces Commander,
Operation OVERLORD
From *Lecture on Military Leadership* given at The University of St Andrews,
November 1945



Major General Lewis MacKENZIE Canadian Army
Chief of Staff UNPROFOR, Sarajevo
From *Peacekeeper – The Road to Sarajevo*, 1992

Civilians frequently misinterpret the pomp and ceremony that surround military life. The strict protocol is not perpetuated for the benefit of the individuals who, by virtue of their rank, are entitled to the various perks; it exists to identify clearly the chain of command, and to let everyone know who is in charge, and who has the final responsibility for making those tough decisions on which human lives depend. If leaders benefiting from the perks start to believe the perks are for them personally, rather than for their rank and the overall good of the organisation, they are well on their way to becoming bad leaders.



General Omar BRADLEY

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff USA, 1950

From a paper on *Leadership*, 1966

A leader should possess human understanding and consideration for others. Men are not robots and should not be treated as though they were machines. I do not by any means suggest coddling. But men are highly intelligent, complicated beings who will respond favourably to human understanding and consideration. By this means, their leader will get maximum effort from each of them. He will also get loyalty, and in this connection it is well to remember that loyalty goes down as well as up. The sincere leader will go to bat for his subordinates when such action is indicated.



General Sir Peter DE LA BILLIERE

Regarding his time in Korea, 1953

From *Looking for Trouble*, 1994

As for myself, I had to learn how to command men the hard way. I arrived totally inexperienced, but now I was making plans which involved men's lives: every day I had to convince the men that the plans were good, and then ensure that everyone stood by what we had agreed. Commanding men – I began to see – is actually a question of getting them on your side, over a period of time, and working to bring them together as a loyal and coordinated team.

...I made particular efforts to visit all the men in their hoochies. We were living an extremely limited existence, isolated from the rest of the world in our little warren of bunkers, yet tied to a tight routine, busy for every minute of our waking hours, and all the time fighting the cumulative exhaustion brought on by strain and danger. In such conditions it was hard to find the time or energy to talk to the men: yet I forced myself to go and sit in their hoochies and chat to them, breaking down the formality of rank structure, until I understood them and they understood me. I also made a point of briefing down, or passing on any information I was given to everyone in the platoon, so that they all knew what was going on.

The men were my life, and they meant a tremendous lot to me. Working with them, getting the best out of them seemed almost a calling. Thinking the matter through, I always came back to the same conclusion: that the more I did for them, the greater my

own reward. This theory, constantly proved in practice, became part of my philosophy in life: if you really look after people – which does not mean being soft with them, but taking more trouble about them than you take about yourself – they quickly appreciate your efforts on their behalf. You win their respect, and a special relationship develops. Talking to them on the boat, I conceived the idea of staging a platoon concert – and this proved a hilarious success, with everyone who had the slightest talent taking part.



Commander Roger LANE

Operations Officer, HMS Coventry during Falklands Campaign, 1982
From The Human in Command, 2000

Commander Lane illustrates the importance of knowing your personnel and the way they may react to decisions you take as a leader.

The first day of the passage south was most poignant. The ships that were detailed to go to the Falklands had spent long hours receiving ammunition, spares, and supplies from ships that were returning to the United Kingdom. This was done while at sea. We had three ships alongside in succession, hastily transferring anything that they thought we would need for our venture. Finally, there was a short period of time to write a hasty note home and transfer mail to the last ship alongside before the group split, then the southbound ships were on their own. My own feelings as I sat at my radar console and watched the group disappear to the north were intense. At that point no one knew what to expect, and speculation was rife. Leaving loved ones behind is nothing new to the military community, but the sudden diversion from Gibraltar and the ominous nature of what was happening on the diplomatic front added uncertainty, and there were endless questions about likely possibilities and outcomes. Our teams needed to prepare not only for military operations, but also for ship survival. Damage control exercises were carried out, building up in complexity; operational exercises that were thought to approximate the Argentine capability were also devised. Throughout this period, however, personal thoughts were paramount.

The modern sailor is an intelligent human being. Unlike the leaders of the past, today's leaders cannot rely on blind allegiance. Therefore, giving sailors as much information as possible generally elicits a positive response. I decided that a file of all the assessment signals that had been sent from our UK headquarters (including some of a sensitive nature) should be kept in the operations room for anyone to read. That file became a focus of attention, with the ship's teams devouring its contents during the

quiet hours at night. The signals generally covered the diplomatic efforts of the US Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, and the responses of the governments concerned. Thus it was that the perceived rights and wrongs of the affair were shown to the ship's company, and there emerged a full consensus that the ship should be sent on this mission.

Our sailors also needed to prepare themselves from a personal point of view. The realities of a hostile environment needed to be recognized. Trying to persuade a nineteen year old sailor that he ought to make a will and sort out his personal effects is far from easy. Someone that young does not wish to confront his own mortality, he expects his officers to do that for him. During one of my nightly sessions with the Commanding Officer, I remember discussing whether the men should shave off their beards so that they would be safer when wearing anti-gas respirators and whether they should take down all their personal photographs, because these created a fire hazard. Such issues may seem trivial, but a ship company's morale could be affected by a decision either way. If our decisions showed the sailors the starkness of what they might face (not that we knew either!), they might react negatively. I felt that the risk was worth taking and that the beard issue should be a personal choice. Similarly, I decided that photographs should be permitted around their bed spaces, providing that the photos passed the scrutiny of their mess deck officer. Although it may now seem inconsequential, I felt strongly that to force sailors to shave their heads and remove personal mementos from their sleeping spaces would have a negative effect and would deny them, in some way, their right to personal choice. They might believe that we, the command, wanted to create clones of the perfect fighting sailor by removing their individual human traits. By allowing personal choice, we prevented the sailors from thinking that we were dehumanizing them.

There were, however, rumours that some sailors, of all ranks, were having premonitions of death. This I found to be unnerving. I had never encountered it before, and, although I understood that anyone might see death as a possibility, I felt that it was unhealthy to dwell on the subject. In my view, the problem was that we had too much time for thinking; if we kept ourselves busy, perhaps those morbid thoughts would recede. Thereafter, I spent long hours talking to my teams about anything at all—from what we ourselves were doing, to the state of world politics. They had to be kept diverted.



Reverend (Wing Commander) Jonathan CHAFFEY
Royal Air Force College Chaplain, Royal Air Force Cranwell
Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2004

In leadership I want to include the word 'servant-hood' and I believe that a lot of leadership theory lacks that word and I am not sure that we pay enough attention to it as an absolutely central part of leadership. There was a famous chaplain, Cecil Pugh, who got a posthumous George Cross during the Second World War. He was on a troop ship when it came under fire and they couldn't get everyone out of the hold before the ship sank. When they had rescued as many people as possible, Pugh asked to be lowered into the hold to be with those who could not be saved where he died with them. That is an extreme example of servant-hood in leadership but, the sentiment is something we should aspire to. On a more everyday level, the most famous chaplain in our Armed Forces' history was probably a man called 'Woodbine Willie' (because he always had a packet of cigarettes in his pocket). During the First World War, he was asked for advice as how to work in the trenches by a new chaplain and he said, "live with the men, go everywhere with them, go to the front line that is where you get your credibility; they will forgive you lots of things but they will not forgive you any lack of courage". Humility is also a core element of servant-hood; it comes from the Latin *humilitas-tatis*: 'of the ground;' you have got to put yourself on the ground, and that is a core element of servant-hood. Anyone who hasn't got humility as a leader hasn't got respect.



Group Captain Michael NEVILLE
Officer Commanding Royal Air Force Lyneham, 2009
Extract from paper *Leadership Under Fire – Iraq 2006/2007*

It is my personal belief that you need to know your men. You must understand how they tick, what their limits are and how best to motivate them. As an operational commander you have to expend more personal energy than in any other post. You have to develop relationships with your subordinates and superiors in order to get the best from them and for the Force. Time spent in developing decent interpersonal relationships is never wasted. However, it is or can be extremely fatiguing and it is at times when you are at your lowest ebb that you, as a commander, need your own reinforcement.



Group Captain Stu ATHA

Station Commander Royal Air Force Coningsby

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2007

We all have weaknesses and strengths and the trick is to match one person's weakness with another person's strength, you don't want to compound weakness with weakness. The strongest team, I think, is made of individuals with differing characteristics. There are times you want to exploit perhaps the decisive element of the team and there are other times when different characteristics are required. I would not like to be part of a team where we were all alike and we were all alpha males. I think within our environment there is scope for all sorts of personalities.



Wing Commander Fin MONAHAN

Joint Services Command and Staff College

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

You must try to put yourself in the shoes of those you are leading, this is probably one of the most valuable things you can do. Try to imagine you are them and think about whatever it is you are trying to deliver, understand that and know your people. When you pitch up as a leader you need to remain calm, inject some humour but try to not be the funny man, you need to be straight and utterly politically correct, take people for whom they are, regardless of gender, race or background, appreciate people for what they are and what they can bring to the party. Be up first thing despite being up all night. You have to be like a battery, your energy will give other people energy. You need to give feedback more frequently than the mid-term and the appraisal so that they know whether they are doing well or not, but if they have not done well then you need to tell them how to make it better.



WILLING TO TAKE RISKS

The RAF needs leaders who understand the difference between a gamble and a risk and are willing to take measured risks in appropriate areas without abrogating responsibility. This will be achieved if leaders at all levels achieve 2 things: they must themselves set the example in this regard and must develop an ethos where a failure to act is considered a more serious fault than making a mistake.

Field Marshal Erwin ROMMEL

Commander in Chief the Afrika Corps and Army Group West, WWII

From *The Rommel Papers*, 1953

It is my experience that bold decisions give the best promise of success. But one must differentiate between strategical or tactical boldness and a military gamble. A bold operation is one in which success is not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficient forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the other hand, is an operation which can lead either to victory or to the complete destruction of one's force. Situations can arise where even a gamble may be justified as, for instance, when in the normal course of events defeat is merely a matter of time, when the gaining of time is therefore pointless and the only chance lies in an operation of great risk.



Edgar VINCENT

Comment on Admiral Viscount Horatio Nelson.

From a paper, *Nelson and Mission Command*, 2004

Admiral Horatio Nelson's 19th Century adoption of devolving responsibility to his Captains to achieve success in battle, which was a major development in maritime warfare at that time.

Nelson was also a leader who never for a moment lost sight of his core objective, 'to sink, burn and destroy' the enemy; he was determined to make this happen, determined to dominate and shape events. His obvious intention was to lead from the front and place his own life on the line. In thus communicating and, in today's terminology, 'living his values,' as a fighting commander, he increased the fighting capacity of an already elite force by an order of magnitude.



Seb COX

Royal Air Force Air Historical Branch

From Royal Air Force Leadership Conference, 2009, *discussing Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris' actions during the inter-war years*

Harris was first sent to India to take command of 31 Squadron in 1921, three years after the end of the First World War and this was a time of severe retrenchment of defence spending. Since WWI the squadron had been re-equipped with Bristol fighters.

31 Squadron came under army command, not RAF. All British forces in India were responsible to the Viceroy and funded by the Indian government budget. So when Harris protested about his men's living conditions, he was referred to a colonel in the Royal Engineers who proudly told him that his men's barracks in Kompoor were the very ones that had been successfully defended in the Indian mutiny (Indian mutiny of 1857, sixty four years earlier). Harris was understandably not terribly impressed. Indeed he spent much of his time in India flying escort missions to vulnerable army supply convoys supporting the latest punitive offensive into tribal territory. He felt, however, that the army had failed to appreciate the wider range of tasks that could have been undertaken to exploit airpower's, speed and reach.

The army, in this case of course, the Indian army, despite the fact that then as now they were heavily dependent on the support from the RAF, did not provide sufficient funding. The result was that the aircraft were virtually falling to pieces. Harris' Bristol fighters frequently took off on the bare rims of their wheels as the solid tyres of the aircraft disintegrated and there were no replacements available. The undercarriage axles were attached to the aircraft with locally made rope for the same reason. His squadron also flew with obsolete and dangerous single ignition engines despite the fact that the government in the UK at the time were selling off modern dual ignition engines as scrap. The government in India would not fund even minimal levels of purchase for spare parts and there was no interest in army circles in remedying that situation.

Only when stories appeared in the UK press was an inquiry instituted under Air Vice-Marshal John Salmon which revealed the sorry state of the RAF in India and recommended far-reaching changes. Harris however, was posted directly from India to Iraq in 1922 to take command of 45 Squadron. He believed afterwards that he was moved to prevent him from revealing the true state of affairs in India to Salmon. If true the stratagem failed as he spoke to Salmon before he left.



General Sir Archibald WAVELL

Senior commander during WWII

From *Generals and Generalship*, 1941

He [a general] must have ‘character,’ which simply means that he knows what he wants and has the courage and determination to get it. He should have a genuine interest in, and a real knowledge of, humanity, the raw material of his trade; and most vital of all, he must have what we call the fighting spirit, the will to win. You all know and recognise it in sport, the man who plays his best when things are going badly, who has the power to come back at you when apparently beaten, and who refuses to acknowledge defeat. There is one other moral quality I would stress as the mark of the really great commander as distinguished from the ordinary general. He must have a spirit of adventure, a touch of the gambler in him. As Napoleon said: “If the art of war consisted merely in not taking risks, glory would be at the mercy of very mediocre talent”. Napoleon always asked if a general was “lucky”. What he really meant was, “Was he bold?” A bold general may be lucky, but no general can be lucky unless he is bold. The general who allows himself to be bound and hampered by regulations is unlikely to win a battle.



Sergeant Norman C JACKSON

Lancaster Flight Engineer

Citation for Victoria Cross awarded for duties in Bomber Command, 1944

This airman was the flight engineer in a Lancaster detailed to attack Schweinfurt on the night of 26th April, 1944. Bombs were dropped successfully and the aircraft was climbing out of the target area. Suddenly it was attacked by a fighter at about twenty thousand feet. The captain took evading action at once, but the enemy secured many hits. A fire started near a petrol tank on the upper surface of the starboard wing, between the fuselage and the inner engine.

Sergeant Jackson was thrown to the floor during the engagement. Wounds, which he received from shell splinters in the right leg and, shoulder, were probably sustained at that time. Recovering himself, he remarked that he could deal with the fire on the wing and obtained his captain's permission to try to put out the flames.

Pushing a hand fire extinguisher into the top of his life jacket and clipping on his parachute pack, Sergeant Jackson jettisoned the escape hatch above the pilot's head. He then started to climb out of the cockpit and back along the top of the fuselage to the starboard wing. Before he could leave the fuselage his parachute pack opened and the whole canopy and rigging lines spilled into the cockpit.

Undeterred, Sergeant Jackson continued. The pilot, bomb aimer and navigator gathered the parachute together and held on to the rigging lines, paying them out as the airman crawled aft. Eventually he slipped and, falling from the fuselage to the starboard wing, grasped an air intake on the leading edge of the wing. He succeeded in clinging on but lost the extinguisher, which was blown away.

By this time, the fire had spread rapidly and Sergeant Jackson was involved. His face, hands and clothing were severely burnt. Unable to retain his hold he was swept through the flames and over the trailing edge of the wing, dragging his parachute behind. When last seen it was only partly inflated and was burning in a number of places.

Realising that the fire could not be controlled, the captain gave the order to abandon aircraft. Four of the remaining members of the crew landed safely. The captain and rear gunner have not been accounted for.

Sergeant Jackson was unable to control his descent and landed heavily. He sustained a broken ankle, his right eye was closed through heavy burns and his hands were useless. These injuries, together with the wounds received earlier, reduced him to a pitiable state. At daybreak he crawled to the nearest village where he was taken prisoner. He bore the intense pain and discomfort of the journey to Dulag Luft with magnificent fortitude. After ten months in hospital he made a good recovery, though his hands require further treatment and are only of limited use.

The airman's attempt to extinguish the fire and save the aircraft and crew from falling into enemy hands was an act of outstanding gallantry. To venture outside, when travelling at two hundred miles an hour, at a great height and in intense cold, was an almost incredible feat. Had he succeeded in subduing the flames, there was little or no prospect of his regaining the cockpit. The spilling of his parachute and the risk of grave damage to its canopy reduced his chances of survival to a minimum. By his ready willingness to face these dangers he set an example of self-sacrifice, which will ever be remembered.



Sergeant Curt TOOTH

Senior Non-Commissioned Officer, Mechanical Transport (MT),

Operation TELIC 2, 2003

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

Whilst deployed to Basra I was a Corporal in command responsible for running the MT Control. This post would require me to support not just flying operations, but the interchange and servicing of the white fleet vehicles used by the Unit. One day we were approached to convey fuel to Al Amarah, passing through Basra and travelling North. The fuel was required to support Special Forces and was crucial to operations in that area. I spoke to the resident Royal Air Force Regiment cell who gave a brief on the local intelligence for the last 24 hours. They also gave intelligence on the areas we would need to travel through. After the brief we made an assessment of the trip, taking into account the time scale in which we needed to deliver the fuel. The next morning we got up to date intelligence, I back-briefed the convoy on the new information and the roads we were travelling. We departed early that morning to enable us to safely pass Basra, before travelling North. We reached Al Amarah, delivering the fuel within the required time scale.

The task was not the responsibility of the MT Section at Basra, however, after weighing up the risk and importance of the task and impact on other operations, we delivered the fuel.



Sergeant Keith MILLS

Operation HERRICK, Christmas Eve 2007

Received Ambulance Services Institute Military Award 2008

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

The Medical Emergency Response Team was on its way to pick up two casualties; little was known about the condition of the patients. The routine is that the paramedic would receive the casualty and then hand over to the doctor. When we landed I stepped out of the Chinook and signalled for the wounded to come, one walking injured came towards me and I asked him where the other casualty was and he said they were just getting him. I told him to go onto the Chinook and directed him towards the nurse to be assessed. I could see in the distance a lot of Marines and some movement; I was concerned as the Chinook makes a lot of noise and was a large

target. The Marine was on a stretcher and had an insulating blanket over him. After loading the Marine, I informed the pilot to take off and I then had to assess the casualty. When I removed the blanket he had one arm removed by the explosion, one leg completely removed and the other holding on with tendons. I knew that he needed fluid but how were we going to administer it? Time was critical, the Marines on the ground had already tried to use the arm but that wasn't successful. Normal helicopter medical procedure would be to use the top of the arm or the shin to drill into bone, but the Marine had a lot of muscles. Despite the vibrations, movement and noise of the aircraft I had to make the decision to take a risk and use the pelvic bone to infuse the fluid. This was the first time this procedure was used in theatre and I was informed later that it saved the Marines life.



Sergeant Phil CRAWFORD

Physical Training Instructor, Operation TELIC, 2007

Royal Air Force Leadership Interview, 2009

At the very beginning of Operation TELIC, a sergeant, on hearing the chemical alarm, started to run toward the COLPRO (Collective Protection). Although, unfit, he was also frightened and this gave him the feeling of clammy hands, tightness of chest and difficulty in breathing. He thought that he was experiencing chemical poisoning and as a consequence administered his combo pen. This not only highlights the need for fitness, but re-iterates the need for Adventurous Training (AT), where you can be exposed to risk, understand your emotions and then learn how to deal with them so that you will be a more rounded individual.

Whilst deployed I was responsible for the Rest & Recuperation (R&R) of those based in Iraq. It was important that the groups that came for R&R did exactly that. The aims of the facility also gave the groups opportunities to do various AT activities. Individuals arrived having just come from a high op tempo where they were being mortared and potentially shot at, all part of their normal days routine. Getting them to then take part in AT activities was a way of allowing them to develop a better understanding of risk and giving them an avenue to release stress from their operational experiences. I observed two types of people, those that thought they were invincible and those that were on the other end of the scale. By doing many of the activities such as tomb stoning and rock climbing, it allowed the groups to understand how they feel when they are scared and learn how to cope with their emotions. When taking part in AT there is always an element of risk; however, risk is a very personal

thing, for example hanging on the end of a rope with a safety line may not be risk to one person, but would be to another. Moreover, as a professional facilitator of AT, I don't allow groups to take serious risk but controlled risk. That's why AT is a great medium for personal development as it allows you to be in a situation where you can learn to handle the emotions involved in coping with fear and then when faced with fear in a real life threatening situation, you are ready.



Squadron Leader David HICKS

Regarding his experience as Officer Commanding Yorkshire

Universities Air Squadron

Royal Air Force Leadership Interview, 2009

During my time at Yorkshire Universities Air Squadron (UAS), I found that most young people of today can do extraordinary things if they are given the opportunity and have both the determination and confidence to give it a go and take a risk. However most don't, even when the opportunities are laid on a plate for them. Whilst this is somewhat of a generalisation on the youth of today, it seems that most of the 'silent majority' would rather sit in front of their game consoles. I believe young people grow up being told how great they are, that they are never wrong, never being allowed to fail and thus learn by stepping out of their comfort zone.

Part of the solution is about giving young people opportunities to learn, sometimes by making mistakes, I am not saying without any reprimand or repercussion, but without prejudice. The Second In Command and I regularly conversed with the cadets whilst they were on the game consoles, not only to get to know them, but to get the best out of them. This engagement allowed the cadets to also feel that there wasn't an 'us and them' attitude and that in order to achieve anything, we had to do it together. It is also important that limits and guidance given are set from the start. We don't want a generation that feel they can do what they want without due consideration and an understanding of what could go wrong. Engendering this culture does take some effort and risk on the part of a boss. This, to me, was an important aspect of my leadership and willingness to challenge what was the accepted norm of running a UAS. However, the rewards were fantastic as we produced a dynamic, energised organisation that was not afraid of pushing the boundaries, that was constantly moving forward in a proactive manner and relishing the new opportunities created on the way.

I concede that to nurture such an environment is probably easier on the ground than in the air, but if you are a person who is not willing to take risks, the chances are you will never accomplish anything more significant than what you have accomplished so far. Many successful people are successful because they were willing to take some sort of risk to get there. In my experience you get more out of personnel when bosses are willing to encourage calculated risk taking. Those not willing to take risks should continue living and working the life that they are given, without complaint; instead of taking control and choosing how they want to live and work. After all life is not a 'dress rehearsal'.



A risk is a chance taken in the light of due analysis of options and consequences, supported by contingency planning for unsuccessful outcomes. Such process might take months or moments, but without it you are taking a gamble.

Wing Commander Colin BRUCE
Royal Air Force Leadership Centre, 2009



FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE

In a world that is now changing faster than ever, where technology is advancing rapidly, the RAF needs leaders who are flexible in approach and able to consider new ways of doing things. RAF leaders must be open minded, responsive to change, constantly looking for the opportunities that change brings and be able to cope with the discomfort that is associated with change.

Lieutenant Commander G HUTCHISON

Regarding Sir Ernest Shackleton's Leadership

From Advanced Command and Staff Course Paper, 2003

In 1907, Shackleton led an attempt to be the first to the South Pole. He and his men trekked across hundreds of miles of the Antarctic continent to within ninety-seven miles of the Pole. He knew that being the first to reach the Pole would have brought him everlasting fame and glory. However, Shackleton and his men were weakening, and he knew that a final push to the Pole would put their lives in grave danger. He turned back. As strong as his desire to lead expeditions was, his sense of responsibility for his men was stronger. When his wife asked him how he found the strength of will to turn, he answered: "I thought you would rather have a live donkey than a dead lion".

In addition to being a principled choice, this decision gave those who served under him on *Endurance*, confidence that their lives would not cavalierly be sacrificed to meet the expedition's goal. Shackleton's action powerfully clarified the objectives of the *Endurance* expedition: crossing Antarctica was its goal, but a fundamental if implicit qualification was that all the men should survive – this in a business where some loss of life was normal, not exceptional. This clarification, along with the knowledge of Shackleton's general experience in polar exploration, helped ensure confidence in, and the credibility of, Shackleton's leadership. It helped give Shackleton what John Gardner calls "true moral leadership". All military commanders, whatever rank or position, should cleave to this one simple but indispensable 'golden rule' – the most important resource we have is our people.

Shackleton's clarity of aim, when faced with inordinate change all around, was a product of his innate flexibility. He possessed the superb quality not only of adapting rapidly to changed strategic circumstances, but was both determined and astute in communicating the consequent change in aims and objectives to his people. When *Endurance* finally sank, Shackleton, without melodrama or excitement merely said, "Ship and stores have gone – so now we'll go home". Jeremy Larken DSO, a crisis management consultant, in his advice to current and potential leaders from industry and the military, summarises thus:

The mark of the really practical and effective leader in action is an ability to assimilate a new – and possibly shocking – situation with the utmost rapidity, re-assess whilst depositing the baggage of the previous (and now often irrelevant) circumstances, establish new optimal direction, set matters in hand immediately, and bring your people with you. It was a quality possessed by Shackleton in high measure.

General Sir Archibald WAVELL

Senior Army Commander WWII

From *Generals and Generalship*, 1941

The general must know how to get his men their rations and every other kind of stores needed for war. He must have imagination to originate plans, practical sense and energy to carry them through. He must be observant, untiring, shrewd; kindly and cruel; simple and crafty; a watchman and a robber; lavish and miserly; generous and stingy; rash and conservative. All these and many other qualities, natural and acquired, he must have. He should also, as a matter of course, know his tactics; for a disorderly mob is no more an army than a heap of building materials is a house.

Socrates

Now the first point that attracts me about that definition is the order in which it is arranged. It begins with the matter of administration, which is the real crux of generalship, to my mind; and places tactics, the handling of troops in battle, at the end of his qualifications instead of at the beginning, where most people place it. Also it insists on practical sense and energy as two of the most important qualifications; while the list of the many and contrasted qualities that a general must have rightly gives an impression of the great field of activity that generalship covers and the variety of the situations with which it has to deal, and the need for adaptability in the make-up of a general.

Now the mind of the General in war is buried, not merely for forty-eight hours but for days and weeks, in the mud and sand of unreliable information and uncertain factors, and may at any time receive, from an unsuspected move of the enemy, an unforeseen accident, or a treacherous turn in the weather, a bump equivalent to a drop of at least a hundred feet on to something hard. Delicate mechanism is of little use in war; and this applies to the mind of the commander as well as to his body; to the spirit of an army as well as to the weapons and instruments with which it is equipped. All material of war, including the general, must have certain solidity, a high margin over the normal breaking strain. It is often said that British war material is unnecessarily solid; and the same possibly is apt to be true of their generals. But we are certainly right to leave a good margin.



Commander Roger LANE

Operations Officer HMS Coventry during Falklands Campaign, 1982

From *The Human in Command*, 2000

We had been hit by three 1,000-pound bombs, each of which had exploded. In the ensuing fireball, I was knocked out of my chair and hurled across the ops room. Several seconds later, I came to beneath a radar display that had fallen on top of me. The sights and sounds were horrific: little pockets of fire spread over the deck, cabling was sparking; emergency lights glowed; smoke was everywhere; and screams emanated from someone in the computer room below. I crawled over and tried to pull him out, but he slipped from my grasp and fell back into the inferno that had been his workstation a few moments earlier.

Even before I got to my feet, it became clear to me that the ship was in terminal decline. We were heeling at a ridiculous angle, and it was getting worse. The first bomb had entered the ship just forward of the computer room, below the ops room. The explosion created a fireball that emerged from the computer room hatch and flew through the ops room, leaving devastation in its wake. The second bomb had exploded in the forward engine room and breached the aft bulkhead – thus opening the ship's two largest compartments to the sea. At that moment, all I knew was that although a minute earlier I had been defending the ship against attack, I now lay dazed and injured in the corner of the ops room. The sailors who were left with me wandered aimlessly about in shock and needed to be got out to the upper deck. I did not have time to debate, either within myself or with anyone else, whether I should take action or even whether my injuries would allow me to do so. Those sailors needed to be ordered, herded, and guided to safety through passageways now full of twisted metal and up through hatches where the ladders had been burned away – all in pitch darkness and smoke. A firmer, harsher form of leadership was now required; basic training was to be of use after all! I distinctly remember standing astride a hatch with the deputy weapons engineer officer, each of us cajoling and pulling sailors through. Ultimately we reached the highest space we could attain, adjacent to the gun direction platform. The door was jammed; sailors were squeezing in and beginning to panic. I pushed my way through and hammered the clips apart, thus freeing the door and allowing thirty men to reach fresh air and the comparative safety of the upper deck. Were all of these actions just reflexes? Did they stem from some deep sense of responsibility? Was I propelled by a determined sense of self-preservation? I suspect it was an amalgam of all three. Such is command.



Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter SQUIRE

Chief of Air Staff, 2000-2003

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2004

As a leader, and I'm now talking specifically about aircrew, he or she must have credibility. By credibility I do not mean that they have to be the very best pilot or WSO on the squadron, but they have to be pretty good and, at some stage - perhaps at the senior flight lieutenant / junior flight commander level - they probably have to be in the top four or five. This provides the basis for reputation, professionalism and credibility. If this level of performance cannot be maintained as a squadron commander and beyond, because of other pressures, the knowledge of past reputation will confer credibility.

The Falklands War brought the need for this home to me because at that time I had always seen my role, both as a flight commander and then a squadron commander within Harrier Force and the NATO context, of being a mini station commander fighting a deployed site, as opposed to getting airborne and leading from the front in the air. If we had gone to war on deployment in Germany or on the Northern Flank in Norway, it would not have surprised me if I had flown very little because I believed that my role was to lead the Squadron on the ground and to make sure that it was an effective fighting unit. That was the way I had mentally prepared myself for a war in NATO.

When No 1(F) Squadron was sent to the South Atlantic to operate from a carrier that was no longer necessary, because the Royal Navy provided the command function and we were now a squadron integrated into the ship's command structure. And in the same way that Fleet Air Arm squadron commanders do not have the breadth of command responsibilities as they would in the RAF - they were closer to being senior pilots - so I, too, was now suddenly a senior pilot leading my team. It was very necessary, therefore, for me to lead from the front in the air, and that came as something of a surprise. Fortunately, I did have enough skill and credibility at that stage to be able to do so, but it was quite a different approach to conflict than I had ever anticipated.



Group Captain Steve ABBOTT

Operating Base Commander, Kabul Air base, Afghanistan, Operation VERITAS, 2001

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2004

Regarding an incident in which Flying Officer Paula Watson received a commendation for the leadership she showed as Duty Air Movements Officer.

In January 2001 the RAF, under the auspices of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had restored the operating capability of Kabul International Airport such that it was capable, not only of providing the only line of communication to support ISAF but, more crucially, providing a means by which aid could flow into Kabul. Equally, it was the means by which the ever-growing army of diplomats and officials could travel with reasonable speed and security. Not surprisingly the airport attracted the attention of those opposed to the interim national government and, throughout February and March of 2001, attempts were made to shell the airport using improvised mortars and rocket launchers. On the night of 30 April, the dissidents achieved their first success, dropping 107mm rocket rounds onto the operating apron and runway.

Whilst the post attack recovery process was underway, notification was received that two C130 aircraft were inbound, one requiring fuel as a matter of urgency, and one to offload Royal Marine Commandos. The arrival of these troops had been subject to a myriad of delays and pressure was mounting to complete the unloading. Despite an expectation that the airfield may imminently come under further attack, the decision was taken to land both aircraft under total blackout for a rapid, engines running, refuel and unload – an unusual procedure fraught with its own difficulties. Once the aircraft were on the ground, speed was to be of the essence and Flying Officer Watson, the Airhead Point of Dispatch Movements Officer, was responsible for co-ordinating the rapid refuelling and unloading of both aircraft. She quickly assembled her movements team in full fighting order and led them out onto the apron. Under her leadership the first aircraft was refuelled and dispatched in under thirty minutes without incident; she then prepared for the second aircraft which was following on quickly behind. The Royal Marines on the second aircraft were aware that the airfield had just been under attack and they were crowded like ‘sitting ducks’ in the pitch black on an unfamiliar aircraft, which was the noisiest thing in an open and clear space. As the aircraft taxied in and the ramp dropped, Flying Officer Watson wasted no time in organising the Commandos and ensured their rapid disembarkation to a nearby shelter. Despite the risks involved, and urgency required, to dispatch the aircraft for its onward journey, Flying Officer Watson had the forethought and judgement to quickly organise the re-loading of two pallets on to the C130 so as not to waste the outbound sortie.

Field Marshal Erwin ROMMEL

Commander in Chief the Afrika Corps and Army Group West, WWII
From *The Rommel Papers*, 1953

It is also greatly in the commander's own interest to have a personal picture of the front and a clear idea of the problems his subordinates are having to face. It is the only way in which he can keep his ideas permanently up to date and adapted to changing conditions. If he fights his battles as a game of chess, he will become rigidly fixed in academic theory and admiration of his own ideas. Success comes most readily to the commander whose ideas have not been canalised into any one fixed channel, but can develop freely from the conditions around him.



Senior Aircraftsman Alec MAXFIELD

Operation TELIC, 2007

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

Before deploying for Op TELIC, I was trained to be a member of a four person Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team. On arriving at Basra I was part of Joint Force EOD, commanded by the Army. As a lance corporal equivalent, I was re-tasked, thrown in the deep end and was in charge of a troop of fifteen, including sappers and other senior aircraftsmen. I certainly wasn't prepared in terms of pre-deployment training but obviously prepared through general military training. The main duty was responding to rocket attacks on the camp, of which there were many. When the tasking came through I was paired up with a Royal Engineer sergeant as my Bomb Disposal Officer and I worked solely with him. He would go and receive the information relevant to the tasking. From the tasking I would determine what equipment was necessary and any explosives we might need. I would then ensure all the personnel and equipment that was required to go on the task was ready. If we ever got out on the ground and we didn't have it, it would be my responsibility. This was quite a step up for me, certainly in terms of being responsible for the team. The most difficult part of the tour was seeing the destroyed belongings of personnel after a rocket attack. I was very conscious of this and tried to ensure that my team was able to cope with these types of emotions.



Sergeant Richard SCOTT

Senior Non-Commissioned Officer Medical Emergency Response Team, Operation HERRICK, 2008

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

We got the call from Joint Operations Centre (JOC), which advised us of an urgent request for casualty evacuation of a trapped soldier in a Mastiff (armoured patrol vehicle) that had been hit by a road-side bomb. The information gathered had to be assessed in order to ascertain the risk involved and also the personnel and equipment required. Initially it seemed a very simple extraction; the casualty would require assistance from a fire crew with cutting equipment to get him out of the vehicle, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Quick Reaction Force (QRF). There was 30 minutes planning time at the JOC, but not much planning could happen in the Chinook due to the noise. As part of the team we decided that I would leave the aircraft and pick up the casualty with the fire crew, EOD and QRF.

Once we had flown to the designated Helicopter Landing Site (HLS), it was late at night but near the HLS was a vehicle; the team moved up the hill, it felt eerie except for the comforting noise of the rotors turning from the Chinook. When we arrived we had expected to see soldiers around, but there was no one, we were out in the open and felt vulnerable. Around the vehicle there were large holes from road side bombs, and then a soldier arrived and informed us that the Mastiff was 500m further down the road. The spinal board, cutting equipment and our own Personal Equipment (PE) was not only very heavy but not easy to carry. As we moved down the road passing more large craters, and concerned that we would ourselves trip a bomb, we followed the soldiers.

By the time we had arrived at the Mastiff I was very concerned that we had now alerted the enemy we were there; the noise in the distance was very identifiable. To minimise the risk I had to do a quick assessment of the casualty and formulate the plan to get the soldier out of the vehicle. Inside the vehicle there were three soldiers, two at the front and one in the rear. I decided that the only way to get into the vehicle was to the rear, but as the Chinook was making a lot of noise I asked the signaller to inform the pilot to return in 40 minutes. It was then deadly silent and the fire crew started cutting which made a lot of noise and sparks, I was very conscious that the noise would make us a target and the cutting equipment wasn't actually making any significant dent. I had to reassess the situation; I decided to take the risk and get the soldier out using a torso brace, it was going to be the only way to get him out of the vehicle. I had to organise the soldiers so that all activity was completed with everyone working together to ensure the soldier did not incur any more injuries, it was a case of lifting the soldier vertically out, then as soon as he was released from the vehicle move him horizontally onto the spinal board. It was difficult to get the team to move the soldier due to the lack of lighting and little room for manoeuvre inside the Mastiff.

Once completed we then had to move the soldier back to the Helicopter Landing Site, but he had to remain as stable as possible, I noticed there was still a spare vehicle so decided it would be better if the soldier was placed on that vehicle whilst the rest of the team tabbed 500m back.



Corporal Simon OSWALD

**3 Squadron, Royal Air Force Regiment, Royal Air Force Wittering,
Mentioned in Despatches for acts of bravery in Afghanistan, 2008**

During a routine clearance patrol outside the airfield at Kandahar one of the vehicles detonated an anti-tank mine. The vehicle was practically torn in two by the explosion and all occupants were blown from the vehicle and wounded to varying degrees. The Flight Commander, was unable to exercise command due to his wounds. Corporal Oswald commanded his vehicle crew to provide protection and with no regard for his personal safety, and with the potential threat of a follow-up attack or further explosion, he immediately moved to the scene of the incident. He made an immediate and accurate appreciation of the situation and crawled towards an area close to the casualties in order to clear a safe route for extraction.

Once the casualties had been recovered, he set about administering first aid to one of the casualties who had sustained severe blast injuries. Corporal Oswald also took command of the aftermath and controlled the casualty evacuation to the helicopter whilst continuing to administer life-saving medical aid to one of the casualties. As a result of Corporal Oswald's actions, both in commanding the immediate response and administering first aid, all casualties were still alive on reaching the medical facility, although two later died of their wounds. Corporal Oswald believes he was just one element of the team and was surprised to be singled out for this award and as such regards it as a team award. Sadly two very good gunners were lost in the incident.



Senior Aircraftswoman Juliette LEWIS

Operation TELIC, 2007

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

During a detachment to Basra, late at night, we were in the middle of an electric storm. The storm was sending almost constant flashes of lightning across the sky. I was driving back from the Aircraft Servicing Point with a co-worker, having picked up an airman who was transiting through Basra for just one night. We were on our way to the Mess when we suddenly came under bombardment of mortar fire. I brought the vehicle sharply to a stop and yelled at everyone to hit the deck. We lay there for a few seconds while I got my thoughts together. I knew we weren't safe to stay by the van, as my pre-deployment training had taught me that if a mortar landed by us, we would be obliterated by shrapnel. As I looked up, a mortar landed just in front of us. I knew it would be up to me to get everyone moving. I could hear one of the passengers crying from shock and my other passenger just had his head down. I assessed my area and chose the best place to take cover. At this point, a handful of mortars landed in fairly close proximity so I knew we had to move fast. "On the count of three, we're going to get up and run to that building, to the left of the tree". I yelled. I could see the passenger was too scared to move so as I counted to three; I grabbed the shoulder strap of his body armour to give him reassurance and pulled him along with me. We ran to cover and assumed our positions. Once there, I tried to stay collected as I calmed him down and reassured him. It was the most surreal moment of my life. I felt like I was in a film. One thing that I did know for sure at the time was that I had to lead the three of us out of that situation and there was no time to hesitate. I had to be confident in what I was doing. Any hesitation could have cost all of us our lives.



ABLE TO HANDLE AMBIGUITY

Ambiguity pervades our lives and becomes prevalent with the Clausewitzian ‘friction’ that causes the fog of war. At the more junior levels of leadership there may be little ambiguity but at the highest levels it is considerable. Our leaders must be able to handle it and, if possible, turn it to their advantage.

If I always appear prepared, it is because, before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and meditation.

Napoleon BONAPARTE 1769 - 1821



Doctor Peter SAXTON

Director Capstick Saxton Associates

From Paper *The Uses of Ambiguity in Leadership*

The price of peace is ambiguity.

Christine Gray

From International Law and the Use of Force

There are opportunities in grey areas.

Barbara Capstick, Mediator

Ambiguity, which might be simply defined as lack of clarity, does not have a good reputation. The word is often used to connote evasiveness, equivocation, or lack of rigour. Politicians are sometimes accused of being ambiguous to avoid commitment. However, most of us use it. Any one who has struggled to find the right word to avoid hurting someone's feelings, will have insights into how ambiguity can be helpful.

Much of our early education is deterministic, even bi-polar. There are right, as opposed to wrong, answers to questions. This outlook is fostered by technical careers. An engineer needs to be able to calculate stresses accurately, an accountant profit and loss, and so on. Training and discipline enables the professional to arrive at answers accurate to within useful limits. Ambiguity can lead to wrong analysis, so we have to dispel it. We need to have the "right" answer as a precursor to right action.

The reality we face, however, is that sometimes ambiguity cannot be dispelled. If this is the case, we need to learn to deal with it. The good news is that ambiguity is not

always a hindrance. In the hands of a skilled and thoughtful leader, it can make a critical contribution.

Promotion brings responsibilities of increasing complexity, and complexity is ambiguity in one of its many guises. In the field of leadership, the time-tested methods don't seem to work as they once did. Complexity arises because leaders at the top tend to become less involved in organisational inner workings, and more concerned with the organisation's environment, and the future. This sort of management will involve engagement with national and international agencies such as [military commands, non-government organisations, international organisations – 'interagency/comprehensive approach' in British Defence Doctrine terminology government departments, regulatory authorities, staff unions, and powerful suppliers]. It may be necessary to build alliances with independent organisations and secure cooperation with powerful stakeholders. This is **inter**-organisational leadership, and it is very different in its nature and requirements from the **intra**-organisational form in which most leaders will have been schooled. Inter-organisational leaders have to operate in conditions of low or no authority. In the absence of authority, there is an overriding need for persuasive, consensus-building skills.

In 1980, Stanford University in Los Angeles investigated the role of means and ends clarity amongst senior managers involved in joint ventures, in over a hundred large US corporations. Against all intuition, the research revealed that the corporations that consistently out-performed all others were those that ensured both parties were clear about how they were going to do things (means), but where there was ambiguity about final objectives (ends). It challenged all previously held assumptions about the leadership of joint ventures, which always emphasised the need for clarity. Clarity about **what** we are trying to achieve can, it appears, damage the consensus on which performance depends because of its fundamental nature; as opposed to less disruptive niggles about **how** to do things. The findings recommended a judicious use of ambiguity when defining ends.

Negotiators, who are also consensus seekers, learn to love ambiguity. Opening rounds are all about trying to gain clarity on the other side's true position, while remaining vague about your own. Ambiguity can confer strategic advantage. Negotiators raise the level of debate away from detail. A skilled negotiator will feel for the level of generality at which an agreement will be possible. I experienced this when negotiating service level agreements some years ago. Stipulating something as precise as "All maintenance work will take place during hours of closure" would be firmly refused. However, changing the words to "Maintenance work will be carried out in such a way as to minimise inconvenience" gained agreement, precisely because it was less precise. Increasing ambiguity made an agreement possible.

Consensus can also be built on the ambiguity of silence. Some years ago I acted as a spokesman for a large number of airlines in representations to the Competition

Commission. To make an effective representation it was necessary to gain complete agreement throughout this large group of airlines about our case. But the airlines were competitors, commercial rivals, and would readily fall out over issues that were critical to competitive advantage. We achieved consensus, and therefore success, by agreeing only to deal with the areas about which we could make common cause – and to remain silent about the rest. It meant there were issues that could not be dealt with in that process, but better deal with most than none at all.

There is diplomacy in these skills – using language in a way that will sooth rather than exacerbate a problem. Peace negotiators know that certain topics must be kept off the agenda. They admit only things that bring the sides closer. They deploy ambiguity in dangerous areas for the best possible reason – to prevent the talks breaking down. In situations of high emotion and raw sensitivity, mediators too rely on re-framing, and ambiguous language, to avoid the risk of over-reaction and disruption between disputing parties. Keeping sore points vague can make the difference.

To end at the beginning, some people have reservations about the uses of ambiguity in leadership - they suspect that it might be manipulative. I believe it is no more manipulative than leadership generally. All leadership is about getting groups of people to make some sort of concerted effort. The leader is critical to producing that effort, and in shaping it to an end. Whether this is manipulative in a pejorative sense is determined by the integrity of the leader, not by the subtlety of the method.



Captain Sir Basil LIDDELL-HART

Military commentator and correspondent
*From *Thoughts on War*, 1944*

No man can be a great military leader unless he has the ability to cut through overlying difficulties, and to see clearly the few essentials in any problem with which he is faced. In any problem there are never more than a few essentials, which are vital to that problem. These must be grasped out of the mass of details and must never be lost sight of. If in battle a commander loses sight of the few essentials that matter, he will suffer defeat.

But to see the essentials clearly he must not himself get too immersed in detail. Every great commander has had a chief of staff whose main task was the mastery of detail, thus leaving his master free to tackle the essentials together with those details, and

only those details, which were vital to that problem. For though there is much detail with which a commander cannot and must not bother himself, it is interesting to note that every great commander has always concerned himself with certain of the details of his problems. Napoleon and Wellington are two good cases in point.



Jay LUVAAAS

Regarding Napoleon Bonaparte's leadership in the 18th Century *From The Challenge of Military Leadership, 1989*

Of those intellectual qualities essential for high command, Napoleon would probably have placed calculation at the head of his list. "I am used to thinking three or four months in advance about what I must do, and I calculate on the worst," he explained to Joseph. "In war nothing is achieved except by calculation. Everything that is not soundly planned in its details yields no result. If I take so many precautions it is because it is my custom to leave nothing to chance." A plan of campaign was faulty in Napoleon's eyes unless it anticipated everything that the enemy might do and provided the means for outmanoeuvring him. Napoleon recognized, of course, that in all affairs one must leave something to circumstances: the best of plans can fail as a result of what Clausewitz called friction, that is, "the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper," those "countless minor incidents" a general never could foresee. Conversely, sometimes even poor plans succeeded through a freak of fortune.

The worst error a general can make is to distort what he sees or hears. Merely because some partisan has captured an enemy picket is no reason for the general to believe that the entire army is on hand. "My great talent", he told Gourgaud, "the one that distinguishes me the most, is to see the entire picture distinctly".



Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian BURRIDGE

Commander in Chief, Strike Command, 2003

Extract from Windsor Leadership Trust Annual Lecture, 2003

We need to develop intellectual agility that, in turn, allows us to gain the confidence to approach problems from unexplored angles and conceptualize the problem. Perhaps more of an art than a science, we need to learn to explore intellectually, to take risks and to use intuition. Given that intuition is an intangible blend of intellect and experience, in many cases, an intuitive approach does not come easily until individuals have amassed considerable senior experience of their own. But we can all gain vicarious experience through reading, case studies and the like. This pillar represents right brain activity and, for most of us, is seen as stimulating and rewarding.

We need to blend the technical competence, intellectual agility and experience together to generate our emotional maturity as leaders.

One common thread is the ability to communicate and the desire to communicate. Another is intellect; you've got to be smart, because you've got to have the ability to look at chaos and see pathways ... That's how you fight wars. See pathways and look at things from angles that people don't normally look at it.



Flight Lieutenant Art STACEY

Nimrod Captain, 51 Squadron, Royal Air Force Waddington

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2004

On the 16 May 1995 Flight Lieutenant Art Stacey was the captain of Nimrod aircraft XW666 which suffered a catastrophic engine fire in the number four engine. As a result of this fire, Flight Lieutenant Stacey made the impossibly hard decision to ditch in the Moray Firth just 3 miles from RAF Lossiemouth rather than push on and attempt a landing on the runway. It has since been calculated that the aircraft would have lost its wing entirely between 30 – 90 seconds after the ditching; in this case they would not have made it to the runway. All crew were rescued by helicopter and survived the accident.

We were flying an air test out of Kinloss. The aircraft was XW666 and it had been undergoing major servicing for over six months. On board were a minimum crew of

seven. We took off, climbed up 15,000 feet and settled down to commence the air test when we had the first indications of a fire in number four engine. Although we had a fire indication we had no idea that it would be as dramatic as it turned out to be, as in the past, indications had often proved to be false alarms. However, unbeknown to us, over the years two wires had been rubbing on the electrical loom for number four engine and they'd short circuited. So when the engineer put power down to the number four engine anti-icing, it actually went to the starter system for that engine and opened an air valve allowing air from a running engine onto the turbine assembly within the starter motor, which, without any load upon it would have accelerated up to 100,000 rpm or so within a very short period of time. In doing so an awful lot of heat and stress was produced, most of which was centred on a little nut about the size of an old half crown, which then shattered. This spinning turbine disc was now free to exit the starter assembly, where it came into contact with the engine and exploded. A piece of turbine blade, about three and a half inches long penetrated the adjacent fuel tank causing an internal explosion. Fuel from the tank then poured onto the hot starter motor (or what was left of it) and started the fire which was to prove impossible to extinguish.

Also, the initial explosion had blown the engine cowlings off the underside of the number four engine. The idea of putting a fire out in a jet engine is that you don't actually put the extinguishing agent into the engine, you surround the engine in order to smother it and deprive it of oxygen. But to do that of course the agent has to be contained and ours was not, hence the impossibility of putting the fire out.

When the initial fire indications started, to me it was more an inconvenience rather than an emergency, I'd been flying for over twenty years and I'd never had a real engine fire in a Nimrod, so why should today be anything different? This to me was a false alarm and in fact shortly after I returned to flying after the ditching I had an identical situation that turned out to be a false alarm. We'd had spurious warnings but we'd never had a real fire. It was an inconvenience because we'd have to land back after dumping fuel, get the fault rectified, then refuel and turn the aircraft round again and that would probably delay our return to Waddington by civilian aircraft later that day.

So the magnitude of it didn't really dawn until probably twenty seconds or so after the initial warning when we heard an explosion and the aircraft shuddered for approximately half a second. Now this was beyond my experience, and was more than just an inconvenience. This was for real.

I turned the aircraft, popped the airbrakes out and began a rapid descent. I could see that we were about forty-five miles from Kinloss and in between us and Kinloss was Lossiemouth so I told Air Traffic that we were diverting there in order to save a few minutes flying time. One of the crew members down the back did a marvellous job of

keeping me informed and reporting the extent of the fire and he had reported that panels were coming off the wing and he could see the engine through the flames. His final report to me was that the wing was melting – not a word you normally associate with flying. All of this led me to believe that my aircraft was either going to blow up in the air or the wing would finally give up the struggle, hence I decided to put the aircraft on the water and go for a ditching instead of going for a landing at Lossiemouth.

It was a difficult decision, in that, had we been a thousand miles out to sea, there would have been no alternative because there's nowhere else to land but, when you're so close to a runway that you know you can make, it's a different matter. People have asked me, what was it that made me go for that option? Perhaps its my twenty years of flying. From a practical point of view, I thought that at any minute we were going to lose the fight. I didn't know how long we had left but that every second that went by was a bonus.

Its funny the feeling when you approach things like that – the thought of the aircraft exploding held no fears. I thought, I'll probably hear the bang and then I won't feel anything else. What did bother me was the thought that if the wing fell off, then it would take a finite time for the aircraft to come down and hit the water and we would be conscious during that period. Dying during the ditching? No, I had no doubts that we were going to make it, if I'd believed what they'd said about the limited chances of survival on the flight deck I'd have gone for the runway, but I thought, particularly with the weather conditions as they were, "we've got a bloody good chance of surviving this."

Afterwards I considered the decision I had made over and over again. As aircrew, we are trained to analyse our own actions and we do tend to be hyper self-critical. My reaction was that the ditching was the result of something we had done that we shouldn't have or, it was something we hadn't done which we should have. Why hadn't the fire gone out? It should have. We have always been told it would go out with one fire extinguisher. We had discharged all four fire extinguishers into it and it still burned – I was thinking it had to be something that we've done wrong. But, even before the Board of Inquiry came out, a very experienced friend of mine came to visit me in hospital. I respected his judgement, his experience, probably as much as I respect anyone's and he said, "you old bugger, its a good job it was you and not some younger person who might have gone for the runway". From that point I started to feel reassured that I had made the right decision.



Group Captain John JUPP

Officer Commanding Royal Air Force Leadership Centre, 2005

The Royal Air Force needs leaders that are flexible in approach and attitude, consider new ways of doing things. They must also be open minded, responsive to change, constantly looking for the opportunities that change brings and the ability to cope with the discomfort that is associated with change.



Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian BURRIDGE

Commander in Chief, Strike Command

Extract from *Windsor Leadership Trust Annual Lecture, November, 2003*

Generating the ability to understand and analyse ambiguity and chaos must be a key aspect of development for a strategic leader. The bedrock on which it sits is experience and probably lots of it. The key is to use that experience as a springboard for the development of strategic judgement. The barrier is this ability to look at chaos from angles that perhaps others wouldn't – Rosabeth Moss Kanter's 'kaleidoscope thinking'. This calls for a high degree of intellectual and professional confidence at the outset to break out of the institutional mindset. In examining the ambiguous strategic environment in this way allows the patterns to emerge and the pathways to become more visible.



TECHNOLOGICALLY COMPETENT

The RAF culture has always been to embrace new technology. It behoves all members of the RAF to be competent within their specialisation and many, at various stages of their career, will need to display considerable expertise. Yet, in the age of Network Enabled Capability, this may not be enough. Leaders must strive to keep pace with technological advances on a broad front, through a focus on continual personal development, so as to ensure its most effective application.

Stephen BUNGAY

Regarding Air Vice-Marshall Keith Park and his leadership during WWII
From *The Most Dangerous Enemy – A History of the Battle of Britain*,
2000

Park was engaged in determining tactics and working up the defence system. His contribution to this was substantial. He was responsible for introducing the practice of filtering radar plots at Bentley Priory before passing them on to the Groups. Dowding initially opposed this idea, but when Park did it anyway and showed him the results, he agreed. Park worked harmoniously with Dowding, who developed the deepest respect for him. On 20 April 1940, Park took over 11 Group. He was uniquely qualified for the job. He had almost twenty-five years of experience with fighters covering almost all aspects of operations and command, culminating in the unrivalled opportunity to refine the actual weapon, he was now required to wield. He was also a superb leader.



Sir Max HASTINGS

Comment on Group Captain Leonard Cheshire's leadership during WWII
From *Bomber Command*, 1979

It was Cheshire who noticed that very few Halifax pilots were coming home on three engines. He took up an aircraft to discover why. He found that if a Halifax stalled after losing an engine it went into an uncontrollable spin. After a terrifying minute falling out of the sky, Cheshire was skillful and lucky enough to be able to recover the aircraft and land and report on the problem, which he was convinced was caused by a fault in the rudder design.

Handley Page, the manufacturers, then enraged him by refusing to interrupt production to make a modification. Only when a Polish test pilot had been killed making further investigations into the problem which Cheshire had exposed was the change at last made. His imagination and courage became part of the folklore of Bomber Command. He left 76 Squadron in April 1943 and later took command of 617, the Dambusters Squadron. By the end of the war, with his Victoria Cross, three Distinguished Service Orders, Distinguished Flying Cross and fantastic total of completed operations, he had become a legend.

Seb COX

Royal Air Force Air Historical Branch

From Royal Air Force Leadership Conference, 2009, *discussing Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris' actions as a squadron commander during the inter-war years*

Harris' squadron was flying the Vickers Vernon, which was in fact the RAF's first purpose-designed transport aircraft with looks to match. It had a top speed of 68mph and an endurance of seven hours, and could lift a load of one ton or twelve fully equipped troops.

Harris, knew that the RAF in Iraq, as elsewhere, was short of resources. He believed in the flexibility of air power, just as we preach it today. He later wrote, "It immediately struck me that here was potentially the most powerful part of the Air Force in Iraq." Employed on virtually civil duties and making no serious contribution to our very tenuous military in that part of a very disturbed world. He told Sir John Salmon of his feelings and said he could convert the squadron's aircraft into the most useful bombers in the country. Salmon gave him the green light. They had no equipment available and apart from the prospect of at least a year's argument with the Air Ministry over this additional role, it would take at least three or four months to get any equipment out by sea.

The major requirement were bomb racks that were not available locally and were difficult to manufacture out of materials sufficiently strong and light enough not to absorb the total flyable lift of the aircraft. However with the aid of a brilliant technical warrant officer and the workshop, they worried out some roughly finished but serviceable rails from high grade steel sheet. They fitted them up with racks for twenty, fifty and a hundred twelve pound bombs and incendiary containers and by boring an unauthorised hole in the nose of the aircraft, they had a magnificent prone bomb aiming position into which they also fitted a homemade trigger release gear operated by a length of shock absorber. With this equipment, they could not only bomb far more accurately, but were able to make much heavier attacks than DH9s or Bristols could produce.

I am reasonably certain he did not go through the relevant design authority to make this change to his aircraft! He had however significantly extended its capabilities and provided his AOC with an effective offensive capability. But he wasn't finished. He led by example taking on the duties of bomb aimer while one of his junior pilots flew the aircraft. Harris and Flying Officer Rags, the pilot, achieved average errors with the makeshift Vernon bombers of twenty six yards from two to three thousand feet. He extended the aircraft's operational envelope still further by personally instituting night flying with the Vernons and in September 1923, he himself flew the first night-

bombing experiment. The limitations of the implementation and the absence of external navigation aids were serious impediments but he persevered. He also pioneered the development of the primitive marker bomb which proved very effective since the nights in Iraq were usually crystal clear. It is significant that of all the squadrons in Iraq at the time, only 45 Squadron under Harris developed a night capability.

His innovations were not confined to the aircraft. He had an electric luggage cart of the sort seen on railway stations adapted to lift the tails of the Vernons and act as a primitive aircraft tractor. Harris' electric luggage cart innovation unsurprisingly endeared him to the groundcrews who had previously had to lift the tails of the Vernons and manoeuvre the ungainly and heavy four ton empty weight in and out of the hangars using muscle power in the fierce Iraqi heat. With the Harris cart one man could do this on his own. Despite Harris' somewhat disparaging reference to the virtually civil duties, the squadron itself continued to operate in the Air Transport role delivering troops, supplies, mail etc and evacuating casualties.

In terms of vision, defined as creating a shared vision of success and using it to clarify boundaries for himself and others, few doubted the boundaries or the commander's intent in Harris' squadron. Harris had the vision to adapt Vernons to extend their bombing and night flying capability. As for innovation, defined as leading change, taking risks and encouraging others to take risks, as well as bringing a fresh approach and raising the bar, Harris had that in abundance.



Flight Lieutenant Joe COWAN

No1 Air Control Centre, Royal Air Force Kirton-in-Lindsey

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2007

Junior officers are often in a situation where they make decisions that will have an effect, on people, training and equipment, long after they move on to a new post. Good officers consult with their senior non-commissioned officers as they are the experts in their field. Their varied experience and technical knowledge, given that most senior non-commissioned officers have been in the Service for 20-30 years, should be taken into account when facing important decisions. If you choose not to take their advice, as often happens, you will at least know that you have considered all the possibilities and have seen a different perspective

Wing Commander Stephen WILCOCK

Senior Engineering Officer Harrier Force, Gulf War 2, 2003

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2004

When in command, professionally you have got to know your stuff. You have got to be able to bring something additional to the party; I say that as an engineer and as a manager. I have to be able to add to a discussion when I am working with people who are experts within their specialisation and know the depth in detail far better than I do. What the commander brings is a professional perspective, a management perspective, the context and the enablers through interaction with people and other agencies. As the commander you do not need to replicate what others do, you need to be able use their skills and knowledge in the best possible way to achieve the ends. What is absolutely clear to me is that trust and empowerment are key. I see the best in people when they are given responsibility and perhaps the worst when you simply tell them what to do. I have always tried to give people autonomy and to judge people on what they produce and not how they produce it – we are all different and do things in different ways.



Wing Commander Gavin POOL

Officer Commanding Armaments Support Unit, Royal Air Force Wittering

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2006

You need to have the knowledge to ask questions and you need to have the knowledge to be able to identify holes in people's diagnosis. I have never considered myself a specialist in any area. By specialist, I go back to the core of the Air Force, the senior non-commissioned officers. What I have to make sure of is that I know them well enough so that I can trust them, they can trust me, and that I know where their strengths and weaknesses are so that I can then use those people to the best of my ability to identify problems and faults.



Sergeant Curt TOOTH

Senior Non-Commissioned Officer, Mechanical Transport (MT) Trade
Training and Licensing, Royal Air Force Waddington
Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

Whilst at Specialist Training School, Royal Air Force Brize Norton, 2004, I was approached by one of my instructors. He informed me that we were having problems getting students the use of airframes to gain experience, a requirement for the Towing Of Large Bodied Aircraft (TOWLA) and obtaining the TOWLA qualification. This would impinge on personnel going on Out Of Area operations. After consultation with the Squadron, it became apparent that the lack of airframes was not going to improve. I called a meeting with all of my instructors to brief them. One of the civilian instructors presented me with drawing of a frame that would simulate two of the main airframes held at Brize Norton. After consultation with various sections on the Unit it became apparent that there were not funds to build this simulator. I researched the cost regarding accidents related to aircraft tug moves and the cost of re-training, I presented my finding to the Mechanical Transport Trade sponsor who found the required funds to enable the build of the airframe simulator. Some months later we took delivery of the simulator, greatly improving the skills of the students and reducing the risk of aircraft towing accidents.



Squadron Leader Dave HARROP

Defence Equipment & Support Abbey Wood
Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

The majority of engineering positions will place you as a subject matter expert and point of contact on the first day of the job. This places a large responsibility on the individual to become technologically competent in order to maintain credibility within the section and be able to challenge industry and external section over the higher level issues. It is however recognised that the individuals working for you are the real experts in the technology and in the early stages should be relied upon to give sound advice and be consulted before policy is established.



ABLE TO LEAD TOMORROW'S RECRUIT

As society develops, each new generation of recruits to the RAF is different. They have been seen by some as worse – *Children today are tyrants. They contradict their parents, gobble their food, and tyrannize their teachers.* (Socrates - **469 BC - 399 BC**) – t'was always thus. Leaders must recognise the qualities the new generation brings and must learn the leadership skills that will allow them to maximise their potential. Everyone in the chain of command needs to understand the new generation, be able to lead and inspire them so that in their turn they will lead the RAF to new heights of excellence.

Be an example to your men, both in your duty and in private life. Never spare yourself, and let the troops see that you don't, in your endurance of fatigue and privation. Always be tactful and well mannered and teach your subordinates to be the same. Avoid excessive sharpness or harshness of voice, which usually indicates the man who has shortcomings of his own to hide.

Field Marshal Erwin ROMMEL

Commander in Chief the Afrika Corps and Army Group West, WWII



Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter SQUIRE

Chief of Air Staff, 2000-2003

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2004

As a good leader you do not have to be a great orator, but communication is important, however you do it. Indeed, some, who stutter and stammer, will still find a way of communicating. To give you a few examples from the Falklands War, I was in a ship with a Captain who never spoke to the crew - I was embarked for 8 weeks and I never once heard him address the crew as a whole. He is reputed to have spoken twice on that deployment: once on the way south when he told them that, "He expected them to do their duty and that anybody who did not would be sent home in disgrace," and once on the way home when he said "You have done well, now go and tell the nation what a tremendous job the Navy has done". He never used the CCTV system or the Ship's pipe. During that same deployment I spent a few nights in HMS Invincible and her Captain used to speak to the Ship's company through the CCTV system every night, just for 5 minutes, to tell them what had gone on during the day and what they might expect the next day. He was a tremendous communicator and, as a result, the buzz in the ship was totally different. Those examples are chalk and cheese, and there are lots of styles between them; the important thing is you have to find your way of communicating with your people.

One of the attributes of a good leader is somebody who can bridge the rank divide without losing the respect he needs. He does not become one of the team totally, but he is able to bridge the gap between them at whatever rank level. This applies to his own officers, both more senior and very junior but also the senior non-commissioned officers and the airmen, and an ability be able to speak to them at a variety of different levels, whether it is chit chat or of a more technical nature. At the same time, it is important not to lose a sense of authority by compromising the fact that you are the

leader. This is something that some people can do and others find more difficult. I remember an example of this given by the first Commander British Forces in the Falklands following the ceasefire. General David Thorne, whom I had known as a major, was a charismatic leader with an enormous interest in people. When I had first taken No 1(F) Squadron ashore at Stanley, it was snowing and really very cold and miserable. General Thorne took the time to visit the site. As he departed, he saw a young airman working on an aircraft. He went up to this man (he had no badges of rank showing because it was so cold and he was wearing a parka coat) and he really put his arm around him, and said "Right, now what are you up to?" The airman looked at him and said, "I'm putting this so and so engine in!" CBF said "Right" and then he started talking about other matters: whether the mail was getting through and whether the food was alright. He chatted on for a little while, still clasping the engine fitter, and then he left. I had watched this going on and I went up to the airman afterwards and asked him if he knew who had been speaking to him, he said "No, he had not got a so and so clue who it was!" So I told him. That was David Thorne's real talent; he could communicate to anybody at any level.



THE ROYAL AIR FORCE DIVERSITY POLICY

Extract from 2009DIN01-137, July 2009

The aim of the Royal Air Force's Equality and Diversity policy is to achieve a diverse, operationally effective workforce in an environment free from bullying, harassment, intimidation and unlawful discrimination, in which all have equal opportunity and encouragement to realise their full potential.



ROYAL AIR FORCE EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY ACTION PLAN - 2009/2011

It is essential that ownership of, and accountability for, Equality and Diversity (E&D) by commanders, supervisors and managers at all levels within the RAF is visible and unambiguous.

Effective leadership:

Makes it possible for the RAF to achieve its overall aims and objectives on equality and diversity whilst delivering operational effectiveness.

Develops the values required for the RAF's long-term development and reinforces these values through personal action and behaviour.

Contributes to the creation of an environment in which all personnel have confidence to identify and tackle inappropriate or unlawful behaviour from the outset.

Maximises individual and team performance, enhancing operational capability.



Stephen BUNGAY

Regarding Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park and his leadership during WWII
From *The Most Dangerous Enemy – A History of the Battle of Britain*,
2000

He [Park] demanded, and got, better facilities for his pilots, including better accommodation and some entertainment. He took the business of decorations for his men very seriously at times when one might have imagined he had other things on his mind, and his care extended down to the lowliest aircraftsmen and mechanics. Typical of his attitude is an incident which took place when he was on a liner on his way to the Middle East in early 1942. Some young pilots on board appeared on the boat-deck, which was reserved for senior officers, and were ordered off by a major. Park heard of this and informed the other senior officers on board that “these young gentlemen have faced and will face dangers that none of you will ever meet. They will share any facilities on board this ship equally with you.” This practice abruptly stopped on Park's disembarkation.

Group Captain R FORD

Excerpt from *personal correspondence*, post WWII

You asked for my definition of leadership. . . . I am very glad to pass it on to you to use as you suggest. It is as follows:

To have true sympathy with your men, constantly endeavouring to see things from their point of view. To know them collectively and individually, and help them carry out their duties. To further their comfort, content and wellbeing. To guard their interests and under all circumstances think first of them and last of yourself. Once convinced of your principles there is nothing they will not do under your leadership.



Field Marshal Sir Bernard MONTGOMERY

Commander Eighth Army and Allied Ground Forces Commander,
Operation OVERLORD

From *Lecture on Military Leadership given at The University of St Andrews, November 1945*

The soldiers of today have different standards, and require more enlightened handling, than the soldiers of bygone days. They will no longer follow blindly and unquestioningly to an unknown end. Today therefore a commander must ensure that his troops always know what they are being asked to do, and how that fits in with the larger plan.



Air Chief Marshal Sir Paddy HINE

On the essential attributes of a leader

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2005

Top of my list is the ability to inspire, to persuade others to follow and to take pride and pleasure in a sense of belonging to that squadron or unit. The rest I have listed in no particular order, but I think they are all important. The next is credibility: you have to be seen to have sound balanced judgement, not just of situations, but of people, you need to have a good dose of common sense to enable you to make sound decisions; that is not to say that you don't listen to people when making decisions, but that you trust your instinct. I have found that the real mistakes that I have made have been when I have been talked out of a position. So if you are lucky enough to have innate sound judgement, then stick with it. Part of credibility, particularly in the RAF, is the ability of the leader to do the job himself, and that tracks you back into leadership by example, it is no good being commander of a squadron and being a below average pilot. You have to be able to do the job proficiently and others have to see that you do it proficiently, otherwise you lose credibility and if you lose credibility as a leader then you can't lead properly in my view. Having said that, you cannot be knowledgeable about every single thing that you may become responsible for.

The next thing is integrity and trust; once you have shown through your behaviour that you are not a person of high integrity, then you forfeit people's trust and it is very difficult to rebuild, so a leader must be basically honest, have integrity and be trustworthy. And closely allied to that is sincerity, if people begin to think that you are two-faced then that damages your credibility, so sincerity is an important facet of character and its got to be genuine, a lot of people can fake sincerity, but sooner or later they will betray themselves.

Next on my list is consistency, and by that I mean consistency in the way you treat and manage people. People do not mind being told off provided they can see a good reason for it, what disturbs them is when they do not know where they stand, so you are seen to be inconsistent and that will also damage your credibility.

And intelligence is also key, not intelligence in an intellectual sense but mental agility and the ability to see the wider picture and how your role fits into it. The ability to listen to a set of arguments, assimilate them and consider whether or not it alters your perspective. Its all part of the judgement you have when making reasoned decisions. Intellect is important so that decisions can be reinforced by substance.

I take good communicative skills as read and particularly for commanders, as opposed to leaders in other fields, the ability to communicate verbally is very important, in terms of inspiring people and them wanting to come with you.

Personality is important, the ability to relate to people, one-on-one or one-on-many, to make everybody in the organization feel that they are important and that they have an important role to play. The best leaders that I have come across are those who never seem to be short of time, you know whether you go into their office for five minutes or two hours, you always feel that they want to talk to you and when you come out from it you feel uplifted.

Being able to relate to a group of people is also crucial, the ability to communicate: “this is what we are going to do, this is how we are going to do it and this is your role in it”, is all part of communicative skills, but its also part of personality; its how you project your ideas without being arrogant.

You have got to have the kind of personality and attributes that command respect, people may not like you, although it helps if they do, but at least they respect you. I've heard a lot of people say, “well I don't really like him but by God I respect him” and that is very important. Whether they like you or not must be a by-product, you must not seek popularity as some leaders do, but, if they come to see you as a warm caring personality, with a sense of humour and fun, then they will come to like you as well as respect you.

These are all personality traits that come together in the complex overall mix of leadership qualities which I think are important but the bottom line is the leader should know clearly what he wants to achieve and how he's going to achieve it, and how to inspire his team to help him do it because he cannot do it on his own. Each member of the team needs to be involved and to feel his or her contribution is important. The leader must be able to show the way and to keep spirits up when the going gets rough. Remember this: trust and loyalty work both ways, when either is betrayed relationships break down and the team is not as effective as it should be. I actually think that on the whole, really great leaders are born great leaders; they have got those innate talents in personality makeup.

The same leadership traits are important for both our officer corps and non-commissioned officers, throughout the RAF we are looking for the same attributes. If you are a flight sergeant running a line you need to command respect, to have authority, to have the credibility, be able to do the job yourself so that if the corporal runs into problems fixing an engine you understand the problem, so the same things apply.



MENTALLY AGILE AND PHYSICALLY ROBUST

Our leaders need to be able to handle complex and multifarious problems and have the creativity and mental agility to move quickly between various concepts. Their thinking must be innovative and their minds receptive. They must be physically robust and able to withstand the strain of operations, so that their mental capacity does not fail them under stress.

Major Edward ‘Mick’ MANNOCK

Extract from *personal diary*, 1917

Morgan got the Military Cross on the 23rd, and was brought down by one of our own shells on the 24th. It appears that a shell struck his machine at 6000 feet (he was flying too low) and knocked the engine out, broke his thigh and left ankle. The undercarriage also was blown away. Notwithstanding this, he kept his head and planed down into our own lines, but the machine – or what was left of it – broke up on touching earth. He crawled unaided from the wreckage and was inevitably taken to hospital. He said the only thing, which worried him when coming down, was that he might faint before reaching the ground. Some lad!



Flying Officer John CRUICKSHANK

Pilot, 210 Squadron, 1943

Citation for Victoria Cross for actions whilst flying for Coastal Command.

This officer was the captain and pilot of a Catalina flying boat which was recently engaged on an anti-submarine patrol over northern waters, close to the Arctic Circle. When a U-boat was sighted on the surface, U-boat 347, Flying Officer Cruickshank at once turned to the attack. In the face of fierce anti-aircraft fire he manoeuvred into position and ran in to release his depth charges. Unfortunately, they failed to drop.

Flying Officer Cruickshank knew that the failure of this attack had deprived him of the advantage of surprise and that his aircraft offered a good target to the enemy's determined and now heartened gunners. Without hesitation, he climbed and turned to come in again. The Catalina was met by intense and accurate fire and was repeatedly hit. The navigator/bomb aimer was killed, the second pilot and two other members of the crew were injured. Flying Officer Cruickshank was struck in seventy-two places, receiving two serious wounds in the lungs and ten penetrating wounds in the lower limbs. His aircraft was badly damaged and filled with the fumes of exploding shells. But he did not falter. He pressed home his attack, and released the depth charges himself straddling the submarine perfectly, sinking U-boat 347 immediately.

He then collapsed and the second pilot took over the controls. He recovered shortly afterwards and, though bleeding profusely, insisted on resuming command and retaining it until he was satisfied that the damaged aircraft was under control, that a

course had been set for base and that all the necessary signals had been sent. Only then would he consent to receive medical aid and have his wounds attended to. He refused morphia in case it might prevent him from carrying on.

During the next five and a half hours of the return flight he several times lapsed into unconsciousness owing to loss of blood. When he came to, his first thought on each occasion was for the safety of his aircraft and crew. The damaged aircraft eventually reached base but it was clear that an immediate landing would be a hazardous task for the wounded and less experienced second pilot. Although able to breathe only with the greatest difficulty, Flying Officer Cruickshank insisted on being carried forward and propped up in the second pilot's seat. For a full hour, in spite of his agony and ever-increasing weakness, he gave orders as necessary, refusing to allow the aircraft to be brought down until the conditions of light and sea made this possible without undue risk. With his assistance the aircraft was safely landed on the water. He then directed the taxiing and beaching of the aircraft, so that it could easily be salvaged. When the medical officer went on board, Flying Officer Cruickshank collapsed and he had to be given a blood transfusion before he could be removed to hospital.



Field Marshal Sir Bernard MONTGOMERY

**Commander Eighth Army and Allied Ground Forces Commander,
Operation OVERLORD**

From Lecture on Military Leadership given at The University of St Andrews, November 1945

No man can rise to high command who has not the quality of courage. The highest form of personal courage is required rather in the leader at the lower level – he who has to plunge into the turmoil of the battlefield. The leader at the higher level has to develop his quality of courage into a mental robustness which can withstand the mental stress and strain with which he will be assailed. He must be able at all times to take a dispassionate view of the good and bad fortune which will assail him. He must not allow himself to be distracted by events, or to be led astray from his main purpose by some glittering but ephemeral prize. He must at all times maintain an unbiased view of the situation, and in battle he must be able to judge the true value of the mass of good and bad tidings which will flow in upon him. Every battle resolves itself into a tussle between the wills of the two opposing commanders. Unless he is mentally robust, a commander will not be able to force his will on his opponent. It is well for a commander to remember that no battle was ever lost until the commander thought it so.

Air Commodore Leonard BIRCHALL

Prisoner of War in Japan during WWII

From an obituary printed in The Daily Telegraph, 2004

Air Commodore Leonard Birchall was known as the ‘Saviour of Ceylon’ for the report he signalled on the approaching Japanese Fleet in April 1942. Birchall and his crew from No 413 (RCAF) Squadron had only arrived in Ceylon from the United Kingdom forty-eight hours earlier, when they were immediately pressed into action. After two days of fruitless searching, their Catalina took off early on April 4 and, eight hours later, sighted the Japanese force 350 miles south-east of Ceylon, steaming towards the island.

Realising that he had found the Japanese strike force, Birchall closed to observe that the fleet included five aircraft carriers. Almost immediately his lumbering flying boat was attacked by eighteen fighters. A sighting message was hastily coded and transmitted to base before cannon fire destroyed the Catalina’s radio. The aircraft was then set on fire and, as Birchall landed on the sea, the tail broke off.

Two of the crew were seriously injured and went down with the aircraft. As the survivors swam away from the burning fuel, the radio operator was killed by machine-gun fire in the water. All six of the survivors were wounded, three of them seriously, when they were picked up by the destroyer Isokaza.

Birchall’s signal was garbled on arrival in Ceylon, and requests for amplification went unanswered. However, it gave the clear impression that invasion was imminent. The defences were alerted and forty-eight ships, including the aircraft carrier Hermes, sailed from Colombo and Trincomalee. As the first Japanese air attack was mounted the following morning the defences were fully alerted. The British suffered considerable losses, but the Japanese fleet retreated; Ceylon suffered no further attacks.

Once on board Isokaza, Birchall was singled out as the senior officer, and beaten by his captors in an effort to find out if a radio message had been sent. He steadfastly denied that any such report had been sent, and resisted all attempts to extract information. The badly injured crew were put in a damp lock-up with room for only the three most badly wounded to lie down. After three days they were transferred to the carrier Akagi, flagship of the Japanese commander Admiral Nagumo, before being landed at Yokohama, where the injured were given good treatment.

Birchall and three other crew were taken to the town prison, where they were poorly fed before all the crew were eventually reunited. After five months they were the first inmates at a new camp in the mountains near Yokohama, where two hundred and fifty Commonwealth prisoners from Hong Kong and seventy-five Americans from the Philippines soon joined them.

These had been so badly let down by their officers in previous camps that they proved extremely troublesome; but Birchall quickly instituted a strict code of discipline. He endeared himself to the POWs when he struck a Japanese guard, who was insisting that a badly wounded American should join a working party. Birchall was severely beaten and placed in solitary confinement where he suffered great privation.

In early 1944, he and others were moved to another camp, where ailing men were forced to work in the docks until they collapsed. In protest, Birchall ordered the men to stop working and sit down. Although guards flayed him with clubs and rifle butts, the POWs did as Birchall commanded until the sick were excused from work. He was then taken to a 'discipline camp', beaten senseless and left without food and water for days.

In June 1945, Birchall and two hundred prisoners were sent to a camp near Mount Fuji. When three men died of malnutrition, he organised 'stealing teams' to raid local farms for fresh vegetables to provide the essential vitamins; no more deaths were recorded. Finally, on August 27, American troops arrived to take over the camp.

On his return to Canada, Birchall was appointed OBE in 1946, when the citation recorded that "he continually displayed the utmost concern for the welfare of fellow prisoners with complete disregard for his own safety. His consistent gallantry and glowing devotion to his men were in keeping with the finest traditions of the Service". His own flight engineer, Brian Catlin, who spent much of the time with him as a POW, echoed the feelings of many when he said: "There are many alive today who would not have survived without Birchall."

In 1950, President Harry Truman appointed Birchall an officer of the Legion of Merit, saying: "His exploits became legendary throughout Japan and brought renewed faith and strength to many hundreds of ill and disheartened prisoners".



Corporal David HAYDEN

Gunner, 1 Squadron, Royal Air Force Regiment

Operation TELIC, Basra 2007

Corporal Hayden has become the first RAF Regiment Gunner to be awarded the coveted Military Cross following his outstanding bravery and disregard for his own safety during a sustained fire fight.

Corporal Hayden's citation reads:

Corporal Hayden served in Iraq as a Section Commander on B Flight, Number 1 Squadron RAF Regiment. On 7 August 2007, he was deployed as the second-in-command of a B Flight multiple patrol, call-sign 20A, during a half-Squadron foot patrol in Al Waki. As his call sign came under intense enemy fire, Corporal Hayden, aided by one of his flight, ran into the open to bring Leading Aircraftsman Beard, who lay grievously wounded, into cover, personally accounting for at least one of the enemy in the process. Although being constantly exposed to hostile fire, Corporal Hayden then carried Leading Aircraftsman Beard a further 200 meters to safety. He then returned to his call-sign to rally his men before leading their extraction from the area. With absolute disregard for his own safety, he repeatedly risked his life in order to rescue a wounded comrade and extract his men from danger.

For his outstanding gallantry, selflessness and personal example in the face of a particularly ferocious attack from a determined enemy, Corporal Hayden is awarded the Military Cross.



Air Ministry PAMPHLET 202

Notes for the Guidance of Royal Air Force Officers, 1948

Mental stamina is of the greatest value to a leader. Make no mistake; if you wish to lead others, you must bear the load which rests on all of them. And you must have anxieties they never know, conquer fears they have not heard of, grapple with problems of which they will see only the solution. You must keep on after all others have failed. You must never lose faith in those above or those below you.

Tenacity is a quality for which the British people are famous as a nation, but it should be remembered that it is a virtue only when allied to the others. Without them it is only obstinacy.

Squadron Leader Jason SUTTON

Officer Commanding 1 Squadron, Royal Air Force Regiment,
Operation TELIC, Basra, 2007

For the outstanding leadership of his Squadron over a relentless 6-month operational detachment, Squadron Leader Sutton is appointed as an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire.

An extract from Squadron Leader Sutton's citation reads:

On 19 July 2007, a rocket attack struck his Squadron's accommodation area, tragically killing three and seriously wounding eleven. Despite the loss of almost 10% of his combat strength, stoic, reflective and focused, he led by example. His compassion and steely resolve, displayed in a truly motivational address at the repatriation service for his dead, inspired all. Quickly re-balancing his forces, he continued to deliver all tasks, integrated new Gunners into his Squadron and thoughtfully devised a plan to deny the enemy an area where their malign influence had begun to take root. He deployed a flight-sized foot patrol to re-establish presence in the area of concern. An insurgent small arms attack resulted in an intense fire fight with five enemy dead. Consequently Sutton was confronted with a deteriorating tactical picture. He identified the vital ground and with great personal courage led a half-squadron-sized foot patrol into the AL WAKI Market area to demonstrate resolve and reassure the local population. Initially, his efforts to engage positively with the market traders succeeded, although celebratory gunfire from a passing wedding added an unwelcome tension. However, Sutton was quick to realise its benign nature and maintained positive control by issuing decisive orders, thus calming his men now deployed in defensive positions around the market area. At dusk, the Squadron was simultaneously fired upon by a large, dispersed militia group, armed with heavy machine guns and small arms, and by an Iraqi Police Service Unit. The ensuing fire fight was intense, resulting in the death of a Gunner and a serious leg injury to a corporal. Throughout the 90-minute fire fight, Sutton maintained masterful control; deployed runners to overcome poor communication and constantly re-assessing the contact as it unfolded. Placing himself in the centre of the fire fight and with complete disregard for his personal safety, he commanded with devastating effect, stopping only to recover the wounded Corporal to the nearby patrol vehicles. With the aid of the signaller, they carried the wounded Corporal under direct effective and withering enemy fire, an extraction made all the more difficult by the large pools of untreated sewerage in their path.



Master Aircrew Richard TAYLOR

22 Squadron, Rear Crew Leader, Royal Air Force Valley

Received the Queen's Gallantry Medal for the Rescue on the 'Riverdance', January 2008

'Rescue 122', a Sea King of C Flight 22 Squadron RAF Valley, was called to the aid of 23 persons on board the ferry Riverdance that had lost all power and was in severe difficulties near the coast of Blackpool. As 'Rescue 122' arrived on scene at 2035, the weather conditions were atrocious with low cloud, storm force winds. The battering of the waves against the slab-sided ferry and associated rolling and surfing in the swell meant that on occasion the port bridge wing was dipping into the water and she was at significant risk of capsizing. Riverdance's Captain was requesting the immediate rescue of all non-essential personnel. The crew decided that the safest option was to winch the passengers from the ferry's starboard bridge wing. Unfortunately, the strength of the wind and poor visual references meant that this option was technically extremely demanding and numerous attempts to deliver the winchman, Master Aircrew Richard Taylor, to the deck over the next 30 minutes were unsuccessful. An even riskier option then had to be considered which would involve winching the passengers from the port bridge wing on the low side of the vessel. Through skilful flying, accurate winch operating and considerable courage from Master Aircrew Richard Taylor, a rope hi-line was eventually delivered to the crew. Unable to hold onto the rope owing to the vessel's violent motion, the process had to be repeated but eventually the winchman was delivered to the deck. Conditions onboard were appalling and Master Aircrew Richard Taylor had to make his way up and down the steeply listing deck whilst being battered by waves to lead the evacuation of the passengers and crew. Throughout this whole process he was not secured to the aircraft and at considerable risk of falling from the ferry. While the crew were being recovered to the helicopter the violent movement of the vessel again snapped the hi-line and yet again through skilful winch operating contact was re-established. Eight of the crew were recovered to the aircraft and 'Rescue 122' then flew to Blackpool to drop the passengers, refuel and shut down to wait for further tasking. At 0415hrs, 'Rescue 122' was again scrambled to the Riverdance as the vessel was now stranded on a sandbank and, with her cargo moving freely on the deck, was expected to capsize. Despite already coping with the previous ordeal and being exhausted, the crew safely recovered the remaining nine casualties. Richard Taylor stayed on Riverdance until the last lift when he, along with the Captain, abandoned the vessel to her fate.



POLITICALLY AND GLOBALLY ASTUTE - Air Power Minded

Leaders will be more effective depending upon their aptitude in two areas. The first is their ability to understand and thus cope with the politics of their immediate environment and, hence, their ability to influence those around them. Similarly, a leader's awareness of much wider issues at a national and international level, and their ability to put their actions and decisions into the context of air power and air warfare, is crucial.

Vincent ORANGE

From *Tedder – Quietly in Command*, 2004

Operation CRUSADER, the Second Advance Across North Africa

Tedder, condemned by Churchill, saved by Freeman and Portal

13 October 1941, Tedder sent the Signal that nearly ended all his Cairo worries. Portal had asked him on the 8th for 'a comparison of your own and enemy strengths at different stages, and methods you propose to employ to attain and exploit air superiority'. Tedder and his fellow commanders were agreed that 'we shall be definitely superior in mechanised forces' when CRUSADER began, 'but numerically inferior in the air'. These were the words - 'numerically inferior' - that almost broke him. Churchill would see this signal, and Portal had neglected to warn him that his figures would have political as well as military significance. Churchill seized upon them and accused Tedder of saying that he would not have 'air superiority' not the same thing and not what he would have written.

Portal's reply to Tedder's signal of the 13th arrived. It began with a tart rebuke; the first Tedder had received from a man whom he greatly admired, and had hitherto regarded as more of a friendly colleague than a remote master. The rest of the signal - trite and bombastic - puzzled him until he realised that another voice had dictated it. It was 'obviously pure and unadulterated Winston', he told Rosalinde, one of those signals written 'for the record'; a practice with which Tedder was already familiar. In retrospect, the practice amused him, but not at the time. If the Chief of the Air Staff were to waver in Tedder's support, his days in Cairo were numbered, for he was no favourite of the Prime Minister.

A signal [was] sent by Portal without Churchill's help. The figures, he wrote 'raised acute political difficulty', because Peter Fraser, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, had just asked Churchill 'for an assurance in the light of your unqualified figures'. Churchill had decided that 'no mere process of discounting' between Portal and Tedder would serve, and that Freeman must go out to Cairo.

Freeman paid 'an extremely confidential visit' to Lord Hankey, formally secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence and currently Paymaster-General, on the morning of 15 October. He told Hankey that Churchill, for whom he had no use at all, had taken a dislike to Tedder and wanted Portal to sack him. Portal refused; he, Sinclair and Freeman all said that they would resign if Churchill insisted. Hankey agreed and urged Freeman to see that Portal stuck to his guns.

Churchill had informed Auchinleck, 'you will find Freeman an officer of altogether larger calibre', the Prime Minister asserted, 'and if you feel he would be a greater help to you and that you would have more confidence in Air Command if he assumed it, you should not hesitate to tell me so.'

Freeman had told Tedder that for political reasons Churchill required figures indicating a clear British numerical superiority. They therefore found 660 aircraft available to the RAF, 528 serviceable; 642 available to the Axis, 385 serviceable. Churchill was only partly appeased. He wrote to Sinclair on 21 October, sending a copy to Portal. 'I consider it right and necessary to give Freeman the Air Command in the Middle East, but Tedder could remain as his deputy'. No-one whose opinion had value agreed with the Prime Minister. Freeman had formally assured Portal that CRUSADER's prospects would not be improved by a change of command; that he himself would 'certainly not - repeat not' accept that command, because 'the role of Judas is one that I cannot fill'; and that Tedder was untroubled by Churchill's lack of confidence in him, so long as he retained Portal's 'I gave him that assurance'. Churchill reluctantly gave way on the 23rd and sent Tedder a curt signal of support the next day.



Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter SQUIRE

Chief of Air Staff, 2000-2003

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2004

Those that fought in the Second World War were not only conscious of nationhood and, therefore, King and Country, but also of family and friends. Comradeship and teamwork will always be a motivating factor in conflict; the idea that you will never let your team mates down is a very important driver. You could argue that today's Armed Forces would not see the risk to the nation being as great as it once was. The threat of terrorism and its effect on the nation and on the world may encourage people to serve for Queen and Country again but, it is not as immediate and direct a threat as during the Second World War. So what does motivate people to serve today? They do it because they are professionals, and want to be involved. They do understand that it is in the interests of their country, if not in its direct defence. Furthermore, there remains the strong notion that, "I've been trained to do a job and working as part of a team; I'm not going to let my chums down". Perhaps the motivation has changed but I do not believe that all aspects of serving Queen and Country have gone.



Seb COX

Royal Air Force Air Historical Branch.

On Air Chief Marshal, The Lord Arthur Tedder

From *Tedder – Quietly in Command*, 2004

He was an unusual officer far outside the normal mould for senior military figures. He was physically small, modest, of quiet demeanour, and not much given to the sort of boisterous behaviour so beloved of airmen in both fiction and reality. He was also something of an intellectual, with a Cambridge degree and a serious historical study of the Royal Navy in the Restoration period to his name. For relaxation he liked to play the piano, sketch, or simply smoke his much-loved pipe. These characteristics were far from typical for a senior officer in the Royal Air Force at the time, and some might have been considered positively disadvantageous. Despite this, Tedder rose to the highest rank in the service, became Chief of the Air Staff, and ended his days as a member of the House of Lords. His elevation was the result of a shrewd and analytical mind combined with a courageous and determined character. His leadership was based on professional knowledge and competence, allied to a capacity to talk at the same level to anyone, air marshal or corporal, soldier or sailor, American or Scot. This, allied with a willingness to listen, a natural humanity, and a character almost devoid of obvious showmanship, produced an unusual amalgam ideally suited to leadership in a coalition era, whether as the senior airman in a tri-service command structure in Egypt, or as Deputy Supreme Commander to the equally determined but diplomatic Dwight Eisenhower during Operation OVERLORD...Tedder's quiet approach did not always instantly impress, however, and, when linked with his sometimes perverse sense of humour, occasionally led to his making enemies.

The rather bizarre air command structure for OVERLORD reflected the fact that an airman with those qualities of tact and leadership was needed to impose the judgements of a Solomon on the forceful strategic commanders, Carl Spaatz and Arthur Harris, and the pompous and narrowly focused Trafford Leigh-Mallory. Tedder did not disappoint in this regard, and he almost certainly was the only Allied airman capable of bringing both the senior strategic commanders into line, and doing so in such a way as to retain their respect.

Tedder was in many ways the perfect coalition commander. He was not only acutely aware of the need for sensitivity in all matters when conducting coalition warfare, whether relations with the press or relations with other Allied commanders, but he was also adept at achieving his military objectives within such a framework. He did so in such a way as to ensure he got most of what he wanted without causing dissension and frequently against the previously expressed preferences of those with whom he had to deal. He accurately assessed the contributions each form of military power could make to the overall war effort, and would resist parochial interests whenever they

arose, irrespective of whether they were those of airmen or soldiers. This did not always endear him to others, and his unwavering support of Eisenhower's strategy certainly upset the senior echelons of the British Army. Yet Tedder, who at the start of the war had been a rather obscure two-star officer, was by war's end capable of holding his own both with senior soldiers and airmen and with statesmen of the stature of Churchill and Stalin. He was not overawed by such powerful personalities, and was perfectly capable of operating in a political milieu when required; a capacity which stood him in good stead not only during the war, but afterwards when he became Chief of the Air Staff and, subsequently, on his appointment to the British Military Mission in Washington at the height of the Cold War.

Intelligent, articulate, courageous, tactful and largely free from the parochial single-service concerns which so often cripple commanders once they leave the narrow confines of their own service, Tedder proved himself able to operate at the highest level in an international coalition. He and Eisenhower proved themselves the ideal leadership pairing in the most complex and difficult coalition war ever fought, and they epitomise the effectiveness of a school of leadership which eschewed the flamboyance shown by others in favour of a quieter and more thoughtful approach.



Lieutenant Colonel Tim COLLINS

Commander 1st Battalion The Royal Irish Regiment

From Speech given to troops on the eve of invasion of Iraq, Gulf War 2, 2003

We go to liberate, not to conquer.

We will not fly our flags in their country.

We are entering Iraq to free a people and the only flag which will be flown in that ancient land is their own.

Show respect for them.

There are some who are alive at this moment who will not be alive shortly.

Those who do not wish to go on that journey, we will not send.

As for the others, I expect you to rock their world.

Wipe them out if that is what they choose.

*But if you are ferocious in battle remember to be magnanimous in victory.
Iraq is steeped in history.
It is the site of the Garden of Eden, of the Great Flood and the birthplace of Abraham.
Tread lightly there.
You will see things that no man could pay to see and you will have to go a long way to
find a more decent, generous and upright people than the Iraqis.
You will be embarrassed by their hospitality even though they have nothing.
Don't treat them as refugees for they are in their own country.
Their children will be poor, in years to come they will know that the light of liberation
in their lives was brought by you.*

*If there are casualties of war then remember that when they woke up and got dressed
in the morning they did not plan to die this day.
Allow them dignity in death.
Bury them properly and mark their graves.*

*It is my foremost intention to bring every single one of you out alive.
But there may be people among us who will not see the end of this campaign.
We will put them in their sleeping bags and send them back.
There will be no time for sorrow.*

*The enemy should be in no doubt that we are his nemesis and that we are bringing
about his rightful destruction.
There are many regional commanders who have stains on their souls and they are
stoking the fires of hell for Saddam.
He and his forces will be destroyed by this coalition for what they have done.
As they die they will know their deeds have brought them to this place.
Show them no pity.*

*It is a big step to take another human life.
It is not to be done lightly.
I know of men who have taken life needlessly in other conflicts.
I can assure you they live with the mark of Cain upon them.
If someone surrenders to you then remember they have that right in international law
and ensure that one day they go home to their family.*

*The ones who wish to fight, well, we aim to please.
If you harm the regiment or its history by over-enthusiasm in killing or in cowardice,
know it is your family who will suffer.
You will be shunned unless your conduct is of the highest
for your deeds will follow you down through history.
We will bring shame on neither our uniform or our nation.*

(On Saddam's chemical and biological weapons).

It is not a question of if, it's a question of when.

*We know he has already devolved the decision to lower commanders, and that means
he has already taken the decision himself.*

If we survive the first strike we will survive the attack.

*As for ourselves, let's bring everyone home and leave Iraq a better place for us having
been there.*

Our business now is north.



Flight Lieutenant James HOLLINGWORTH

**Junior Engineering Officer, 27 Squadron, Royal Air Force Odiham,
Operation MATURIN, Kashmir Earthquake Relief, 2005**

Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

An earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale hit the mountainous Kashmir region of Pakistan on 9 October 2005, killing 80,000 and leaving hundreds of thousands injured and homeless.

Three Chinook helicopters from 27 Squadron, RAF Odiham deployed under NATO's Response Force. The team having just come back from the operational tempo of Iraq, was on a period of rest. The heavy-lift helicopters had to be broken down in order to fit into the C17 and then to be reassembled at Chaklala Air Base, Islamabad before aid work could begin.

We arrived early in the morning, which was dusty and warm, and were met by the wing commander leading the team. We were directed to our working location, which was beside an active runway and I assessed the fatigue level of the team before commencing any aircraft work. I had to be cognisant of the pressure to make the aircraft available for tasking versus the correct maintenance of the aircraft and safety of the team.

The host nation's enthusiasm was encouraging. I had to be conscious of their culture; Pakistan had started Ramadan. Not to interfere with their practises, it was important that the team meals were taken indoors during the day. Due to the proximity of the

civilian airport and relative lack of security, I had to be aware of the bigger picture, recognising the security threat, and advising the team as necessary.

During the deployment it was important to ensure those back at the base understood why they were deployed. The engineers would have free periods during the day whilst the aircraft were flying. In order to reduce aircrew fatigue, which could have caused serious flight safety implications, engineering personnel would join the aircrew to help load the aid each day. This was a chance for them to see the smiles of the faces of those getting the aid and it was also important to be part of the bigger team, which maintained the morale of the team at the deployed operating base.

The most difficult part of the deployment was the pressure to achieve versus the aircraft serviceability and crew fatigue. Initially it was important to strike the balance between enthusiasm and getting the rebuilding of the aircraft completed safely. In the middle of the deployment it was vital to maintain morale given the uncertainty of the length of the deployment period and at the end it was essential to ensure that the recovery of the aircraft was completed adhering to the engineering protocol and that the motivation to return did not compromise good engineering standards and practises.



Squadron Leader Jason SUTTON

**Officer Commanding 1 Squadron, Royal Air Force Regiment,
Operation TELIC, Basra 2007**

For the outstanding leadership of his Squadron over a relentless 6-month operational detachment, Squadron Leader Sutton is appointed as an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire.

An extract from Squadron Leader Sutton's citation reads:

Charged with dominating the ground around Basra Air Station primarily to safeguard aircraft from attack, Sutton forcefully delivered a masterly, sophisticated and balanced force protection strategy during the most intense phase of rocket attacks against the airfield. Adroitly balancing the "hearts and minds" aspects with the use and threat of use of force, he personally engaged with local tribal and village leaders, thus encouraging their support and gaining intelligence whilst disrupting the activities of enemy rocket teams.

Sutton deployed his Squadron with studied insight into the dynamics of the local population and struck exactly the right balance. Indeed, whilst highly supportive of the local tribes, he was equally robust with the less aligned factions; his lethal use of snipers struck terror into the hearts of the enemy and resulted in an almost total cessation of rocket launches from within his area of responsibility.



Flight Lieutenant James HOLLINGWORTH

Operation HERRICK, February – June 2008, 15 (UK) Psychological Operations Group
Royal Air Force Leadership Centre Interview, 2009

I was Second in Command of the Psychological Support Element based in Lashkar Gah, supporting 16 Air Assault Bde. There was a core team of eight personnel from the three services of which several were augmentees. Part of the pre-deployment training was an intense course based at Chicksands and pre-reading in order to understand the Afghan culture, their behaviour and attitudes. Although this was a good foundation, you really don't understand the people until you talk face to face and see how and where they live. This communication was deemed essential, especially in any hearts and minds campaign.

A success story of the deployment was when I led a small team into an area where there had been reporting of adverse atmospherics due to the military forces. After face to face discussions with many of the locals about what the military were doing there and what they were trying to do for the Afghan people, the villagers reported that they were not unhappy with the military just unhappy that they never stopped to interact with them. This ensured that valuable resources were not deployed unnecessarily and lessons were learnt regarding the importance of 'boots on the ground'.



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